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We investigate the determinants of regional development using a newly constructed database of 
1569 sub-national regions from 110 countries covering 74 percent of the world’s surface and 97 
percent of its GDP.   We combine the cross-regional analysis of geographic, institutional, cultural, 
and human capital determinants of regional development with an examination of productivity in 
several thousand establishments located in these regions.  To organize the discussion, we present a 
new model of regional development that introduces into a standard migration framework elements 
of both the Lucas (1978) model of the allocation of talent between entrepreneurship and work, and 
the  Lucas  (1988)  model  of  human  capital  externalities.  The  evidence  points  to  the  paramount 
importance  of  human  capital  in  accounting  for  regional  differences  in  development,  but  also 
suggests from model estimation and calibration that entrepreneurial inputs and  possibly human 
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I.   Introduction. 
 
We investigate the determinants of regional development using a newly constructed database 
of 1569 sub-national regions from 110 countries covering 74 percent of the world’s surface and 97 
percent of its GDP.  We explore the influences of geography, natural resource endowments, institutions, 
human capital, and culture by looking within countries.  We combine this analysis with an examination 
of productivity in several thousand establishments covered by the World Bank Enterprise Survey, for 
which we have both establishment-specific and regional data.   In this analysis, human capital measured 
using education emerges as the most consistently important determinant of both regional income and 
productivity of regional establishments.   We then use the combination of regional and establishment-
level data to investigate some of the key channels through which human capital operates, including 
education of workers, education of entrepreneurs/managers, and externalities.  
To organize this discussion, we present a new model describing the channels through which 
human capital influences productivity, which combines three features.  First, human capital of workers 
enters  as  an  input  into  the  neoclassical  production  function,  but  human  capital  of  the 
entrepreneur/manager  influences  firm-level  productivity  independently.    The  distinction  between 
entrepreneurs/managers  and  workers  has  been  shown  empirically  to  be  critical  in  accounting  for 
productivity and size of firms in developing countries (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007, 2010; La Porta and 
Shleifer 2008; Syverson 2011).  In the models of allocation of talent between work and entrepreneurship 
such  as  Lucas  (1978),  Baumol  (1990),  and  Murphy,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (1991),  returns  to 
entrepreneurial schooling may appear as profits rather than wages.  By modeling this allocation, we 
trace these two separate contributions of human capital to productivity.  
Second, our approach allows for human capital externalities, emphasized in the regional context 
by  Jacobs  (1969),  and  in  the  growth  context  by  Lucas  (1988,  2008)  and  Romer  (1990).    These 
externalities result from people in a given location spontaneously interacting with and learning from 3 
 
each other, so knowledge is transmitted across people without being paid for.  Because our framework 
incorporates both the allocation of talent between entrepreneurship and work as in Lucas (1978), and 
human capital externalities as in Lucas (1988), we call it the Lucas-Lucas model
2.   By decomposing 
human capital effects into  those of  worker education, entrepreneurial/managerial education, and 
externalities using a unified framework, we try to disentangle different mechanisms.      
Third, we need to consider the mobility of firms, workers, and entrepreneurs across regions, 
which is presumably less expensive than that across countries.    Our model follows the standard urban 
economics approach (e.g., Roback 1982, Glaeser and Gottlieb 2009) of labor mobility across regions with 
land and housing limiting universal migration into the most productive regions.  This formulation allows 
us to analyze the conditions under which the regional equilibrium is stable and to consider  jointly the 
education coefficients in regional and establishment level regressions.    
To begin, we examine the determinants of regional income in a specification with country fixed 
effects.   Our approach follows development accounting, as in Hall and Jones (1999), Caselli (2005), and 
Hsieh and Klenow (2010).  Among the determinants of regional productivity, we consider geography, as 
measured by temperature (Dell, Jones, and Olken 2009), distance to the ocean (Bloom and Sachs 1998), 
and natural resources endowments.   We also consider institutions, which have been found by King and 
Levine (1993), De Long and Shleifer (1993), Hall and Jones (1999), and Acemoglu et al. (2001) to be 
significant determinants of development.    We also  look at culture, measured by trust  (Knack and 
Keefer 1997), and at ethnic heterogeneity (Easterly and Levine 1997, Alesina et al. 2003).   Last, we look 
at average education in  the region.   A  substantial cross-country literature  points to a large role of 
education.  Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) are two early empirical studies; de La 
Fuente and Domenech (2006), Breton (2012), and Cohen and Soto (2007) are recent confirmations.   
                                                           
2 We do not consider the role of human capital in shaping technology adoption (Nelson and Phelps 1966).  For 
recent models of these effects, see Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005), and Caselli 
and Coleman (2006). For evidence, see Coe and Helpman (1995), Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009), Wolff (2011). 4 
 
Across countries, the effects of education and institutions are difficult to disentangle: both variables are 
endogenous and  the  potential  instruments  for them  are correlated  (Glaeser  et  al  2004).    By  using 
country fixed effects, we avoid identification problems caused by unobserved country-specific factors.  
  We find that favorable geography, such as lower average temperature and proximity to the 
ocean, as well as higher natural resource endowments, are associated with higher per capita income in 
regions within countries.  We do not find that culture, as measured by ethnic heterogeneity or trust, 
explains regional differences.   Nor do we find that institutions as measured by survey assessments of 
the business environment in the Enterprise Surveys help account for cross-regional differences within a 
country.  Some institutions or culture may matter only at the national level, but then large income 
differences  within  countries  call  for  explanations  other  than  culture  and  institutions.    In  contrast, 
differences  in  educational  attainment  account  for  a  large  share  of  the  regional  income  differences 
within a country.   The within country R
2 in the univariate regression of the log of per capita income on 
the log of education is about 25 percent; this R
2 is not higher than 8 percent for any other variable.  
Acemoglu  and  Dell  (2010)  examine  sub-national  data  from  North  and  South  America  to 
disentangle the roles of education and institutions in accounting for development.  The authors find that 
about half of the within-country variation in levels of income is accounted for by education.  This is 
similar to the Mankiw et al. (1992) estimate for a cross-section of countries.   We confirm a large role of 
education, but try to go further in identifying the channels.   Acemoglu and Dell also conjecture that 
institutions shape the remainder of the local income differences.  We have regional data on several 
aspects of institutional quality, but find that their ability to explain cross-regional differences is minimal
3. 
  In regional regressions, human capital in a region may be endogenous because of migration.  To 
make progress, we examine the determinants of firm-level productivity.  We merge our data with World 
Bank  Enterprise  Surveys,  which  provide  establishment -level  information  on  sales,  labor  force, 
                                                           
3 Recent work argues that regions within countries that were treated particularly badly by colonizers have poor 
institutions and lower income today (Banerjee and Iyer 2005, Dell 2010, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2011).     5 
 
educational level of management and employees, as well as energy and capital use for several thousand 
establishments in the regions for which we have data.  We estimate the production function predicted 
by our model using several methods, including Levinsohn-Petrin’s (2003) panel approach. The micro 
data point to a large role of managerial/entrepreneurial human capital in raising firm productivity.   We 
also find that regional education has a large positive coefficient, consistent with sizeable human capital 
externalities.  However, because regional education may be correlated with unobserved region-specific 
productivity parameters, we do not have perfect identification of externalities.   
To assess the extent to which firm-level results can account for the role of human capital across 
regions, we combine estimation with calibration following Caselli (2005).  We rely on previous research 
regarding factor shares (e.g., Gollin 2002, Caselli and Feyrer 2007, Valentinyi and Herrendorf 2008), but 
then combine it with coefficient estimates from regional and firm-level regressions.  Our calibrations 
show that worker education, entrepreneurial education, and externalities all substantially contribute to 
productivity.  We find the role of workers’ human capital to be in line with standard wage regressions, 
which are the benchmark adopted by conventional calibration studies (e.g., Caselli 2005). Crucially, 
however, our results indicate that focusing on worker education  alone substantially underestimates 
both private and social returns to education.  Private returns are very high but to a substantial extent 
earned by entrepreneurs, and hence might appear as profits rather than wages, consistent with Lucas 
(1978).  Although we have less confidence in the findings for externalities, our best estimates suggest 
that those are also sizeable.  In sum, the evidence points to a large influence of entrepreneurial human 
capital, and perhaps of human capital externalities, on productivity.   
  In section II, we present a model of regional development that organizes the evidence.  In 
section III, we describe our data.  Section IV examines the determinants of both national and regional 
development.  Section V presents firm-level evidence and section VI calibrates the model to assess its 
ability to explain income differences.  Section VII concludes. 6 
 
II.  A Lucas-Lucas spatial model of regional and national income 
A country consists of a measure 1 of regions, a share p of which has productivity   ̃  and a share 
1– p of which has productivity   ̃      ̃ .  We refer to the former regions as “productive”, to the latter 
regions as “unproductive”, and denote them by i = P, U.  A measure 2 of agents is uniformly distributed 
across regions.  An agent j enjoys consumption and housing according to the utility function: 
j ja c a c u
   
1 ) , ( ,                                                                         (1) 
where c  and  a  denote  consumption and  housing,  respectively.    Half the  agents  are “rentiers,”  the 
remaining half are “labourers’’.  Each rentier owns 1 unit of housing, T units of land, K units of physical 
capital (and no human capital).  Each labourer is endowed with hR++ units of human capital.  In region i 
= P, U the distribution of initial, exogenous human capital endowment is Pareto in [h,+∞), where h>1.   
We denote its mean value by Hi in region i = P, U. 
A  labourer  can  become  either  an  entrepreneur  or  a  worker.    By  operating  in  region  i,  an 
entrepreneur with human capital h hires physical capital Ki,h , land Ti,h , workers with total human capital 
Hi,h , and produces an amount of the consumption good equal to: 
     
h i h i h i i h i T K H h A y , , ,
1
,
    ,   1       .                    (2) 
As in Lucas (1978), a firm’s output increases, at a diminishing rate, in the entrepreneur’s human capital h 
as well as in Hi,h, Ki,h and Ti,h.  We model human capital externalities (Lucas 1988) by assuming that 
regional total factor productivity is given by: 
 
 
i i i i L h E A A ) (
~
 ,   γ> 0,  ψ ≥ 1.                                                 (3) 
According  to  (3),  productivity  depends  on:  i)  region-specific  factors    ̃ ,  which  capture  geography, 
institutions, and other influences, ii) average human capital in the region Ei(h), computed across all 
labourers who choose to work in the region, including migrants, and iii)  the measure Li of labour in that 
region.  Parameter ψ captures the importance of the quality of human capital: when ψ = 1 only the 7 
 
quantity of human capital Hi = Ei(h)Li  matters for externalities; as ψ rises the quality of human capital 
becomes relatively more important than quantity.  Parameter γ captures the importance of externalities.  
Since γ > 0, there are regional scale effects, which can be arbitrarily small (if γ  0) and which we will try 
to estimate.  We take regional productivity Ai as given until we describe the spatial equilibrium in which 
Ai is endogenously determined by regional sorting of labourers. 
Rentiers rent land and physical capital to firms, and housing to entrepreneurs and workers.  In 
region i, each rentier earns λiT and ηi by renting land and housing, where λi and ηi are rental rates, and 
ρiK by renting physical capital. A region’s land and housing endowments T and 1 are immobile; physical 
capital is fully mobile.  Labourers use their human capital in work or in entrepreneurship.  By operating 
in region i, a labourer with human capital h earns either profits πi(h) as an entrepreneur or wage income 
wi∙h as a worker, where wi is the wage rate.  All labourers, whether they become entrepreneurs or 
workers, are partially mobile: a labourer moving to region i loses φwi units of income, where φ<h.
4 
At t = 0, a labourer with human capital h selects the location and occupation that maximize his 
income.    The  housing  market  clears,  so  houses  are  allocated  to  each  region’s  labour.  At  t  =  1, 
entrepreneurs hire land, human, and physical capital. Production is carried out and distributed in wages, 
land rental, capital rental, housing rental and profits.  Consumption takes place. 




i K H H , ,  of  entrepreneurial  human  capital 
E
i H , workers’ human capital 
W
i H , and physical capital Ki  such that: a) entrepreneurs hire workers, 
physical capital, and land to maximize profits, b) labourers optimally choose location, occupation and 
the fraction of income devoted to consumption and housing, and c) capital, labour, land and housing 
markets clear.  Because physical capital is fully mobile, there is a unique rental rate ρ.  Since land and 
                                                           
4 Assuming that migrants lose a fixed amount of human capital φ ensures that skilled laborers have the greatest 
incentive to migrate. If migrants lose a share of destination earnings, everybody has the same incentive to migrate. 
For simplicity, we assume that moving costs are a redistribution from migrants to locals (e.g., the latter provide 
moving services) and are non-rival with the time spent working.  This ensures that the human capital employed in 
a region, as well as the aggregate income of laborers, do not depend on moving costs.         8 
 
housing are immobile, their rental rates λi and ηi vary across regions depending on productivity and 
population. To determine the sorting of labourers across regions and their choice between work and 
entrepreneurship within a region, we must compute regional wages wi and profits πi(hj). To do so, we 




i K H H , , .  Second, we solve 
for the equilibrium allocation.  We consider symmetric spatial equilibria in which all productive regions 




P K H H , , ,  the  same  wage wP and rental rates λP and ηP, and 




U K H H , , , wage wU, and rentals λU and ηU.   
Throughout the analysis, the price of consumption is normalized to one.  Endogenous regional 
differences in the rental rates of housing and land affect the welfare of labourers in different regions, 
but regional variation in value added does not depend on these prices in our model (precisely because 
value added just consists of the tradable consumption good).  In reality, certain components of regional 
GDP are non-tradable, and their prices will differ across regions (Engel and Rogers 1994).   Since we do 
not have data on local prices, we leave these considerations for future research.  
 
Production and occupational choice 
An entrepreneur with human capital h operating in region i maximizes his profit by solving: 
h i i h i h i i h i h i h i i K T H T K H w T K H h A
h i h i h i
, , , , , ,
1
, , , , ,
max  
        
   ,                                              (4) 




i K H H , ,  firm j 
employs a share of entrepreneurial capital hj/
E
i H , it hires the others factors according to: 





















j i                                            (5) 
As in Lucas (1978), more skilled entrepreneurs run larger firms. 
Equation (5) implies that the aggregate regional output is given by: 9 
 
   
     







1 .                                                          (6) 
Using Equation (6), one can determine wages, profits, and capital rental rates as a function of regional 
factor supplies via the usual (private) marginal product pricing.  That is, the profit πi(h) earned by an 
individual with human capital h in region i is equal to h times the return of entrepreneurial human 
capital in the region,         
 .  The same individual can earn a wage income equal to h times the return 
to workers’ human capital in the region         
 .  A labourer j with human capital hj chooses to be an 
entrepreneur if and only if          
  ∙hj >         
 ∙ hj  and a worker if          
  ∙hj <         
 ∙ hj .  In 

































i i H H H    is total human capital in region i. 
E
i H  increases with the share of the total private 
return to human capital earned by entrepreneurs [i.e. with (1–ʱ–β–δ)/(1–β–δ)].  Equation (7) describes 
the allocation of labour within in a region from the total quantities of human and physical capital (Hi,Ki). 
 
The spatial equilibrium: consumption, housing and mobility 
To compute the allocation of human capital, we must characterize labour mobility by computing 
the utility that labourers obtain from operating in different regions.  Labourers maximize their utility in 
(2) by devoting a share θ of their income to housing and the remaining share (1 – θ) to consumption.  
Since the aggregate income of labourers in region i is equal to wiHi, the demand for housing in the 
region is θ∙wiHi/ηi.  Given the unitary housing supply, the housing rental rate is equal to ηi= θ∙wi∙Hi.  As a 
consequence, the utility (gross of moving costs) of a labourer in region i is equal to: 
 






h w h w
a c u   
 1
, ) , ( ,                                                              (8) 10 
 
which rises with the wage and falls with regional human capital Hi due to higher rents.   To find the 
spatial equilibrium, we need to find the ratio between  wages paid in productive and  unproductive 
regions, which determine the incentive to migrate.  By taking capital mobility and external effects into 



















































                                                    
(9) 
Ceteris paribus, the wage is higher in productive regions.  A higher human capital stock has a negative 
effect on the wage because of diminishing returns but once externalities are taken into account the net 
effect is ambiguous.  In the remainder we assume: 
























A  ,    
which implies that the autarky wage and interest rates are higher in productive regions, so that both 
capital and labour tend to move there.   We can then prove the following (in Appendix 1): 
 
Proposition 1 Under the parametric restriction: 
(β – ψγ)(1 – θ) + θ(1 – ʴ)> 0,                                                            (10) 
 there is a stable equilibrium allocation HP and HU.  In this allocation: 
a)  There is a cutoff hm such that agent j migrates from an unproductive to a productive region if 
and only if hj ≥ hm.  The cutoff hm increases in the mobility cost φ. 
b)  Denote by  U P H p H p H ) 1 (    the aggregate human capital endowment.  Then, when φ = 0, 
the equilibrium level of human capital in region i is independent of the region’s initial human 
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    
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.                                                   (11) 11 
 




and HP increases in HP holding H constant. 
 
Since wages (and profits) are higher in the productive than in the unproductive regions, labour 
migrates to the former from the latter.  The cutoff rule in a) is intuitive: more skilled people have a 
greater incentive to pay the migration cost because the wage (or profit) gain they experience from doing 
so is higher. Even if mobility costs are zero, migration to the more productive regions is not universal. 
This is due to the limited supply of land T, which causes decreasing returns in production, and to the 
limited supply of housing, which implies that migration causes housing costs to rise until the incentive to 
migrate disappears.  Regional externalities moderate the adverse effect of fixed supplies of land and 
housing on mobility.  In fact, for migration to be interior, condition (10) must be met, which requires 
external effects ψγ to be sufficiently small relative to: i) the diminishing returns β due to land and ii) the 
sensitivity θ of house prices to regional human capital. 
In equilibrium, wages are higher in the more productive regions, wP>wU, but the housing rental 
rate is also higher there, ηP>ηU.  As a result, our model predicts that more productive regions should 
remain more productive even after mobility is taken into account.  When migration is costless (Equation 
(11)),  the  human  capital  employed  in  a  region  only  depends  on  its  productivity.    In  this  respect, 
Proposition 1 shows that for our regressions to estimate the effect of human capital, mobility must be 
imperfect (i.e., φ > 0).   When ψ = 1 and φ = 0, national output is equal to: 
     
       T K H H H A Y
W E   

1 
,                                                          (12) 
where A





, , , (      p A A A U P

  of  exogenous  parameters.  More  generally,  under 
condition (10) the Lucas-Lucas model yields the following equation for firm level output:                                                                                              
       
j i j i j i j i i i j i T K H h L h E A y , , ,
1
, ) (
~      ,                                                     (13) 
and the following equation for regional output: 




i i i i i ) ( ) ( ) (
~ 1     .                                             (14) 12 
 
Value added (at the regional and firm levels) does not depend on local prices after inputs are accounted 
for because output in our model consists only of the tradable consumption good.            
  
Empirical Predictions of the Model 
To obtain predictions on the role of schooling, we need to specify a link between human capital 
(which we do not observe) and schooling (which we do observe).  We follow the Mincerian approach in 
which for an individual j the link between human capital and schooling is: 
  j j j S h  exp  ,                                                                   (15) 
where Sj ≥ 0 and μj ≥ 0 are two random variables (distributed according to a density  ) , (  S gi  that 
ensures  that  the distribution of  hj  is  Pareto).    The  return  to  schooling  μj  varies  across  individuals, 
potentially due to talent. This allows us to estimate different returns  to schooling  for workers and 
entrepreneurs. Card (1999) offers some evidence of heterogeneity in the returns to schooling.  In line 
with macro studies, in our regressions we express average human capital in the region as a first order 
expansion around the mean Mincerian return and years of schooling 
i i S
i e h E
 
 ) ( , where i S is average 
schooling while  i  is the average Mincerian return, both computed in region i. 
 
Regional Income Differences 
To test Equation (14) we must express physical capital, for which we have no data, as a function 









i i H A where B>0 is a 
constant.  Substituting this condition and the linearized expression for human capital into (14) we find: 
ln(Yi/Li) = C + [1/(1 – δ)]ln  ̃  + [1+ γψ –β/(1 – δ)] i  i S  + [γ – β/(1 – δ)]lnLi,                  (16) 13 
 
where C is a constant absorbed by the country fixed effect.   The coefficient on regional schooling 
captures the product of the “technological” parameter [1+ γψ – β/(1 – δ)] and the nation-wide average
 of the regional Mincerian returns  i  . The coefficient [γ – β/(1 – δ)] on population Li captures the 
benefit γ of increasing regional workforce in terms of externalities minus the cost β of crowding the fixed 
land supply.  A similar interpretation holds with respect to the schooling coefficient [1+ γψ – β/(1 – δ)].    
If the variation in regional schooling and population is mostly due to imperfect mobility (φ>0), 
the estimated coefficients on schooling and population should reflect their theoretical counterparts in 
(16).  In our model productivity also varies because of limited migration, owing to the fixed housing 
supply.  This  creates  a  serious  concern:  since  in  our  model  some  human  capital  migrates  to  more 
productive regions, any mismeasurement of regional productivity Ai may contaminate the coefficient of 
regional human capital.  We deal with this issue in two steps.  First, we control in regression (16) for 
proxies of Ai.  Although this is not a panacea for the omitted variable bias, it allows us to rule out some 
of the most obvious determinants of productivity.  Second, we compare these results to the coefficients 
obtained from firm level regressions.  In these regressions, we control for regional fixed effects and also 
use  panel  techniques  devised  to  control  for  firm  level  productivity  differences.    We  then  further 
discipline our interpretation of the data by comparing the coefficients obtained from estimation to the 
calibration exercises performed in the development accounting literature.  
 
Firm-Level Productivity   
In (13), the output of a firm j operating in region i depends on the human capital hE,j of his 
entrepreneur (we assume there is only one entrepreneur and identify him with the top manager of the 
firm, as determined by his schooling SE,j and return to schooling j E,  .  It also depends on the average 
human capital E(hW,j) of workers.  Again, we approximate the average human capital of workers in a firm 14 
 
by 
j W j W S e
, ,  
(where  j W,   and  j W S ,  are average values in the firm’s workforce). This implies that the 
human capital in the firm is equal to
j W j W S





, where  j i l ,  is the size of the firm’s workforce.     
Ceteris paribus, in our model entrepreneurs have a higher return to schooling than workers 
because in region i an entrepreneur with schooling S is someone whose return satisfies  i E
S h e , 
 , 
where  i E h , is the human capital threshold for becoming an entrepreneur in region i.  At a schooling level 
S, the entrepreneurial class includes talented labourers whose return satisfies  S h S i E i E / ln ) ( , ,    
while labourers with  ) ( , S i E     become workers. 
    We estimate Equation (16) in logs.  Exploiting the expressions for entrepreneurs’ and workers 
human capital gives the following equation for a firm’s output: 
ln(yi,j) = ln  ̃  + (1–ʱ–β–ʴ) i E,  SE,,j + ʱ i W,  j W S ,  + 
                                         + ʱln j i l , +ʴlnKi,j +βlnTi,j + γlnLi + γψ i  i S ,                                 (17) 
The coefficient on entrepreneurial schooling is the product of entrepreneurial rents (1–ʱ–β–ʴ) and the 
Mincerian return to entrepreneurial education  E  .  The coefficient on workers’ schooling is the labour 
share ʱ times  W  , the Mincerian return of workers.  The coefficient on the firm’s workforce is equal to 
the labour share ʱ. The coefficient on regional schooling is the product of the externality parameter γψ 
and the population-wide average Mincerian return  .
5 
The estimation of (17) allows us to separate the role of the “low human capital” of workers from 
the “high human capital” of entrepreneurs in shaping firm productivity, as well as to get at the effect of 
human  capital  externalities  by  including  regional  human  capital  (and  other  controls).  There  are, 
                                                           
5 In the regional and firm level Equations (16) and (17) the average return to schooling should vary across regions. 
To account for this, one could run random coefficient regressions. We have performed this analysis and the results 
change very little (the results on human capital become slightly stronger).  We do not report them to save space.  15 
 
however, two potential concerns.  First, our model literally implies that output per-worker should be 
equalized across firms within a region.  Realistically, though, output per-worker is equalized across firms 
ex-ante, but its ex-post value varies as a result of stochastic ex-post changes in the values of firm level 
TFP and inputs.  This is the variation we appeal to when estimating (17).
6   Second, since the selection of 
talented  entrepreneurs  and workers  into more productive  firms  may  contaminate  our results,  we 
employ the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) instrumental variables approach.  This approach has been devised 
precisely to control for productivity differences among firms.  
 
III.  Data. 
Our analysis is based on measures of income, geography, institutions, infrastructure, and culture 
in up to 110 (out of 193 recognized sovereign) countries for which we found regional data on either 
income  or  education.    Almost  all  countries  in  the  world  have  administrative  divisions.
7  In turn, 
administrative divisions may have different levels.  For instance a country may be divided into  states or 
provinces, which are further subdivided into  counties or municipalities.  For each variable, we collect 
data at the highest administrative division available (i.e., states and provinces rather than counties or 
municipalities) or, when such data does not exist, at the statistical division (e.g. the Eurostat NUTS in 
Europe) that is closest to it.  Because we focus on regions, and typically run regressions with country 
fixed effects, we do not include countries with no administrative divisions in the sample.   
                                                           
6 Formally, if ex-ante a firm hires Xi,j units of a factor, this results in Xi,j = εX∙ Xi,j units of the same factor being 
employed in production ex-post, where εX is a random shock to the value of inputs (e.g. an unpredictable change  
in the value of equipment, size of the workforce, and so on). Given the Cobb-Douglas production function, the 
firm’s  ex-ante  optimization  problem  (occurring  with  respect  to  the  ex-ante  inputs  Xi,j)  does  not  change  with 
respect to Equations (4) and (5). The only change is that a firm’s productivity also includes expectations of the 
random factors εX. Crucially, this formulation implies that ex-ante returns are equalized, ex-post returns are not, 
which allows us to estimate (17) insofar as our input measures captures the ex-post values Xi,j.  In estimation, we 
deal with the endogenous adjustment of inputs by using the Levinsohn-Petrin instrumental variables approach, 
and view the remaining productivity differences across firms as being the result of classical measurement error.    
7 The exceptions are Cook Islands, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Macau, Malta, Monaco, Niue, Puerto Rico, Vatican City, 
Singapore, and Tuvalu. 16 
 
The  reporting  level  for  data  on  income,  geography,  institutions,  infrastructure,  and  culture 
differs  across  variables.    GDP  and  education  are  typically  available  at  the  first-level  administrative 
division  (i.e.,  states  and  provinces).    In  contrast,  GIS  geo-spatial  data  on  geography,  climate,  and 
infrastructure is typically available for areas as small as 10 km
2.  Finally, survey data on institutions and 
culture are typically available at the municipal level.  In our empirical analysis, we aggregate all variables 
for each country to a region from the most disaggregated level of reporting available.
8  To illustrate, we 
have GDP data for 27 first-level administrative regions in Brazil, corresponding to its 26 states plus the 
Federal District, but survey data on institutions for 248 municipalities.  For our empirical analysis, we 
aggregate the data on institutions by taking the simple average of all observations for establishments 
located in the same first-level administrative division.  Similarly, we aggregate the GIS geo-spatial data 
on geography, and climate at the first-administrative level using the Collins-Bartholomew World Digital 
Map.   
The final data set has 1,569 regions in 110 countries: (1) 79 countries have regions  at the first-
level administrative division; and (2) 31 countries have regions at a more aggregated level than the first-
administrative level because one or several variables (often education) are unavailable at the first -
administrative level.  For example, Ireland has 34 first-level divisions (i.e., 29 counties and 5 cities), but 
publishes GDP per capita data for 8 regions and education for 2 regions.  Thus, we aggregate all the Irish 
data to match the 2 regions for which education statistics are available.   The online data Appendix 
identifies the reporting level for the regions in our dataset.  As noted earlier, all countries have 
administrative divisions (although 31 countries in our sample report statistics for statistical regions).  
                                                           
8 We used a variety of aggregation procedures.  Specifically, we computed population-weighted averages for GDP 
per capita and years of schooling.  We computed regional averages for temperature, precipitation, distance to 
coast, and travel time by first summing the (average) values of the relevant variable for all grid cells lying within a 
region and then dividing by the number of cells lying within a region.  We computed regional averages natural 
resources variables (oil and gas) by first summing the relevant variable for all grid cells within a region and then 
dividing by the region’s population.  We averaged the responses within a region for all the variables from the 
Enterprise and World Value Surveys.  We sum up the number of unique ethnic groups within a region. 17 
 
The principal constraint on the sample is the availability of human capital data.  All countries have 
periodic censuses and thus have sub-national data on human capital, but these data are hard to find.    
Figure 1 portrays the 1,569 regions in our sample.  It shows that coverage is extensive outside of 
North and sub-Saharan Africa.  Sample coverage rises with a country’s surface area, total GDP, but not 
GDP per capita.   For example, we only have data for 7 of the smallest by surface area 50 countries, 9 of 
the 50 lowest GDP in 2005 countries, but for 26 of the lowest 50 GDP per capita countries.   
Our  final  dataset  has  regional  income  data  for  107  countries  in  2005,  drawn  from  sources 
including National Statistics Offices and other government agencies (42 countries), Human Development 
Reports (36 countries), OECDStats (26 countries), the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Survey 
(Ghana and Kazakhstan), and IPUMS (Israel).
9  Our measure of regional income per capita is typically 
based on value added but we use data on incom e (6 countries), expenditure (8 countries), wages (3 
countries), gross value added (2 countries), and consumption, investment and government expenditure 
(1 country) to fill-in missing values.  We  measure regional income in current purchasing-power-parity 
dollars as we lack data on regional price indexes.  To ensure consistency with the national GDP figures 
reported by World Development Indicators, we adjust regional income values so that  -- when weighted 
by population-- they total the GDP at the country level.   
We compute regional income per capita using population data from  Thomas Brinkhoff: City 
Population, which collects official census data as well as population estimates for regions where official 
census data are unavailable.
10  We adjust these regional population values so that their sum matches 
the country’s population in the World Development Indicators database.   
                                                           
9 We are missing regional income per capita for Bangladesh and Costa Rica and national income per capita in PPP 
terms for Cuba. When regional income data for 2005 is missing, we interpolate regional income shares using as 
much data as is available for the period 1990-2008 or, when interpolation is not possible, the closest available 
year. 
10 We also used data from OECDStats (for Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and the UK) and the National Statistics 
Office of Macedonia. 18 
 
In addition, we examine productivity and its determinants using data from the Enterprise Survey 
for as many as 6,314 establishments in 20 countries and 76 of the regions in our sample.
11  Sample size is 
sharply reduced because we estimate alternative OLS specifications on a fixed sample of firms.   The 
Enterprise Survey  covers establishments owned by formal  firms with five or more employees .   We 
collect firm-level controls such as age, foreign ownership, as well as the number of establishments 
owned by the firm.   We also collect establishment-level data on sales, exports, cost of raw materials, 
cost of labor, cost of electricity, and book value of assets (i.e. property, plant, and equipment).  Critically, 
some of the Enterprise Surveys keep track of the highest educational attainment of the establishment’s 
top manager as well as of that of its average worker.  Panel data at the firm level is available for only 7 
of the countries in our sample.  Finally, we collect the two-digit SIC code (e.g., food, textiles, chemicals, 
etc.) of the establishments in our sample.   These exclude OECD countries, as well as informal firms.  We 
relate regional economic development to:  (1) geography, (2) education, (3) institutions, and (4) culture.  
We restrict attention to regional variables available for at least 40 countries and 200 regions. 
We  use  three  measures  of  geography  and  natural  resources  obtained  from  the  WorldClim 
database, which are available for all regions of the world.  They include the average temperature during 
the period 1950-2000, the (inverse) average distance between the cells in a region and the nearest 
coastline, and the estimated volume of oil production and reserves in the year 2000.
12 
We gather data on the educational attainment of the population 15 years and older for  106 
countries and 1,519 regions from EPDC Data Center (55 countries), Eurostat (17 countries), National 
Statistics Offices (27 countries) and IPUMS (8 countries); see the online data appendix for sources.  We 
                                                           
11 The Enterprise Survey data was collected between 2002 and 2009.  When data from the Enterprise Survey for 
one of the countries in our  sample are available  for multiple years,  we use the  most recent  one in the  OLS 
regressions.  In contrast, we use all available years in the panel regressions. 
12 The results in the paper are robust to controlling for the standard deviation of temperature, the average annual 
precipitation during the period 1950 -2000, the average output for multiple cropping of rain -fed and irrigated 
cereals during the period 1960-1996, the estimated volume of natural gas production and reserves in year 2000, 
and dummies for the presence of various minerals in the year 2005. 19 
 
also gather data on the educational attainment of the population 66 years and older from IPUMS for 39 
countries.  We collect data on school attainment during the period 1990-2006 and use data for the most 
recently available period.  We compute years of schooling following Barro and Lee (2010).  We use 
UNESCO data on the duration of primary and secondary school in each country and assume: (a) zero 
years of school for the pre-primary level, (b) 4 additional years of school for tertiary education, and (c) 
zero additional years of school for post-graduate degrees.  We do not use data on incomplete levels 
because it is only available for about half of the countries in the sample.  For example, we assume zero 
years of additional school for the lower secondary level.  For each region, we compute average years of 
schooling as the weighted sum of the years of school required to achieve each educational level, where 
the weights are the fraction of the population aged 15 and older that has completed each level of 
education. 
To illustrate these calculations consider the Mexican state of Chihuahua.  The EPDC data on the 
highest educational attainment of the population 15 years and older in Chihuahua in 2005 shows that 
4.99% of the that population had no schooling, 13.76% had incomplete primary school, 22.12% had 
complete primary school, 5.10% had incomplete lower secondary school, 23.04% had complete lower 
secondary school, 17.94% had complete upper secondary school, and 13.05% had complete tertiary 
school.  Next, based on UNESCO’s mapping of the national educational system of Mexico, we assign six 
years of schooling to people who have completed primary school and 12 years of schooling to those that 
have  completed  secondary  school.    Finally,  we calculate  the  average  years of  schooling  in  2005  in 
Chihuahua  as  the  sum  of:  (1)  six  years  times  the  fraction  of  people  whose  highest  educational 
attainment level is complete primary school (22.12%), incomplete lower secondary (5.1%), or complete 
lower secondary school (23.04%);  (2) 12 years times the fraction of people whose highest attainment 
level is complete upper secondary school (17.94%); and (3) 16 years times the fraction of people whose 
highest  attainment  level  is  complete  tertiary  school  (13.05%).    Accordingly,  we  estimate  that  the 20 
 
average  years  of  schooling  of  the  population  15  and  older  in  Chihuahua  in  2005  is  7.26  years  (= 
6*0.5026+12*0.1794+16*0.1305). 
We compute years of schooling at the country-level by weighting the average years of schooling 
for each region by the fraction of the country’s population 15 and older in that region.   The correlation 
between this measure and the number of years of schooling for the population 15 years and older in 
Barro and Lee (2010) is 0.9.   For the average (median) country in our sample, the number of years of 
schooling in Barro and Lee (2010) is 8.18 vs. 6.88 in ours (8.56 vs. 6.92 years).   Two factors largely 
explain why the Barro-Lee dataset yields a higher level of educational attainment than ours: (1) Barro-
Lee captures incomplete degrees while we do not; and (2) education levels have increased rapidly over 
time  but  some  of  our  educational  attainment  data  is  stale  (e.g.  for  14  countries  our  educational 
attainment data is for the year 2000 or earlier).
13  Since most of our results are run with country -fixed 
effects, country-level biases in our measure of human capital do not affect our results. 
To shed light on the channels through which education affects regional income, we gather 
census data on occupations for as many as 565 regions in 35 countries.    We focus on the incidence of 
directors and officers as well as employers in the workforce.   
We create an index of the quality of institutions  based on seven variables from the Enterprise 
Survey and one from the Sub-national Doing Business Reports.  The Enterprise Survey covers as many as 
80 of the countries and  428 of the regions in our sample.
14  The Enterprise Survey asked business 
managers to quantify: (1) informal payments in the past year, (2) the number of days spent in meeting 
                                                           
13 To make the Barro and Lee (2010) measure of educational attainment more comparable to ours, we make two 
adjustments to their data.  First, we apply our methodology to the Barro-Lee dataset and compute the level of 
educational attainment in 2005.   After this first adjustment, the level of educational attainment computed with 
the Barro-Lee dataset for the average (median) country in our sample drops to 7.07 (7.23).  Second, we apply our 
methodology to the Barro-Lee dataset but –rather than use data for 2005 -- use figures for the year that best 
matches the year in our dataset.  After this second adjustment, the level of educational attainment using the 
Barro-Lee dataset for the average (median) country in our dataset drop further to 6.95 (7.22).  
14  The main reason why we have more regions with measures of institutions than regions with productivity data is 
because many Enterprise Surveys lack data on the education of managers.  For the computation of our index of 
institutional quality, we required a minimum of 10 establishments answering the particular institutions question.  21 
 
with tax authorities in the past year, (3) the number of days without electricity in the previous year, and 
(4) security costs.  The Enterprise Survey also asks managers to rate a variety of obstacles to doing 
business, including: (5) access to land, and (6) access to finance.
15  For each of these obstacles to doing 
business, we keep track of the percentage of the respondents that rate the item as a major or a very 
severe obstacle to business. The final Enterprise Survey variable  we use is government predictability 
(measured as the percentage of respondents who tend to agree, agree in most cases, or fully agree that 
government officials’ interpretations of regulations are consistent and predictable).  We also use the 
overall  ranking  of  the  business  environment  from  sub-national  Doing  Business  reports,  which 
summarizes government regulations in a range of areas, including starting a new business, enforcing 
contracts, registering property, and dealing with licenses.   The index of the quality of institutions is the 
latent  variable  that  captures  the  common  variation  in  these  eight  variables  (the  online  appendix 
presents the results for individual variables).  
To measure culture, we gather data on trust in others from the World Value Survey (WVS) for as 
many as 69 countries and 745 regions.
16  Specifically, we focus on the percentage of respondents in each 
region that answer that “most people can be trusted” when asked whether "Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"
17 In 
                                                           
15 From the Enterprise Survey, we also assembled data on the number of days in the past year with telephone 
outages, the percentage of sales reported to the tax authorities, and the confidence that the judicial system would 
enforce contracts and property rights in business. We also gathered data on public infrastructure  (e.g. power lines, 
air fields, highways, roads) from the US Geological Survey Global GIS database as well as the average travel time 
between cells in a region and the nearest city of 50,000 or more from the Global Environment Monitoring Unit. 
These variables are generally insignificant in regional income regressions (see the online appendix).   
16 The WVS was collected between 1981 and 2005.  When data from  WVS for a country are available for multiple 
years, we use the most recent  data.  We set to missing  38 WVS observations in  five countries (France, Japan, 
Philippines, Russia, and the United States) because the sub-national units in WVS are very coarse. 
17  From WVS, we also examined proxies for  civil values (Knack and Keefer, 1997), for  confidence in various 
institutions, for what is important in people’s lives, as well as for characteristics valued in children.   We also 
examined proxies for broad cultural attitudes with regards to authority, tolerance for other people, and family.  
Finally, we examined the percentage of respondents that participate in professional and civic associations.  The 
results for these variables are qualitatively similar to those for trust in others that we discuss in the text.  22 
 
addition, as a rough proxy for ethnic fractionalization, we gather data on the number of ethnic groups 
that inhabited each region in 1964 for up to 1,568 regions and 110 of our sample countries.
18       
In  addition  to  running  regressions  using  regional  data,  we  examine  GDP  per  capita  at  the 
country level, which comes from World Development Indicators.  All the other country-level variables in 
the paper are computed based on our regional data rather than drawn from primary sources.  The 
country-level analogs of our regional measures of education, geography, institutions, public goods, and 
culture are the area- and population-weighted averages of the relevant regional variables.     
Table 1 summarizes our data.   For each variable used in the regional regressions, Table 1 shows 
the number of regions for which we have data, the number of countries, the median value of the 
country mean, the median range and standard deviation within a country, and the ratio of the variable 
in the region with the highest vs. lowest GDP per capita.  The data show substantial income inequality 
among regions within a country.   On average, the ratio of the income in the richest region to that in the 
poorest region is 4.41.  This ratio is 3.77 for Africa, 5.63 for Asia, 3.74 for Europe, 4.60 for North 
America, and 5.61 for South America.   The country with the highest ratio of incomes in the richest to 
that  in  the  poorest  region  is  Russia  (43.30);  the  country  with  the  lowest  ratio  is  Pakistan  (1.32).    
Interestingly, this ratio is 5.16 for the United States, 2.59 for Germany, 1.93 for France, and 2.03 for 
Italy.   Italy has attracted enormous attention because of differences in income between its North and 
its South, usually attributed to culture.  As it turns out, Italian regional income inequality is not unusual.   
There  is  likewise  substantial  inequality  in  education  among  regions  within  a  country.    On 
average, the ratio of educational attainment in the richest region to that in the poorest region is 1.80.  
This ratio is 2.74 for Africa, 1.68 for Asia, 1.16 for Europe, 1.33 for North America, and 1.81 for South 
America.  The highest ratio is in Kenya (12.99), where education is 8.00 in Nairobi but only 0.62 in the 
                                                           
18 We also gathered data on the probability that a randomly chosen person in a region shares the same mother 
language  with  a  randomly  chosen  people  from  the  rest  of  the  country  in  2004.    The  results  for  linguistic 
fractionalization are qualitatively similar to the results for ethnic fractionalization that we discuss in the text. 23 
 
North Eastern region.  The lowest ratio is .62 in Malawi, where the Central region has lower education 
than the Central region (1.73 vs. 2.79) despite having higher income per capita ($739 vs. $555).   Perhaps 
not surprisingly, there is more variation between rich and poor regions in the fraction of the population 
with a college degree than  in the level of education.   On average, the ratio of the fraction of the 
population with a college degree in the richest region to that in the poorest region is 4.70.  To continue 
with the example of Kenya, 19.5% of the population older than 15 years in Nairobi has a college degree 
while only .9% of the comparable population in the North Eastern region completed college.   
The patterns of inequality among regions within countries are interesting for other variables as 
well.  Table 1 shows large differences in the incidence of employers and of directors and officers in the 
workforce.  There is also substantial variation across regions in culture and institutions.  On average, the 
quality of institutions is lower in the richest region than in the poorest one, which suggests that regional 
differences in institutions may have trouble explaining differences in development
19.  Differences in 
endowments between rich and poor regions, such as temperature and distance to coast, are small. 
 
 
IV.   Accounting for National and Regional Productivity.  
In this section, we present cross-country and cross-region evidence on the determinants of 
productivity.   We present national regressions only for comparison.  These regressions are difficult to 
interpret because in our model we cannot express national output in closed form.   More importantly, 
the  estimated  coefficients  of  education  in  the  cross-country  regressions  may  pick  up  the  effect  of 
omitted variables.  The inclusion of country dummies in the regional regressions alleviates this concern.  
With  respect  to  regional  income,  our  benchmark  is  Equation  (16).    We  have  measures  of  average 
                                                           
19 This does not seem to be merely a matter of measurement error.  The relationship holds even for the regional 
Doing Business indicators, which are fairly objective and less vulnerable to measurement error.  24 
 
education at the regional level, but we do not have either national or regional data on physical capital or 
other inputs, so these variables only appear in the firm-level regressions in Section V.   
Table 2 presents our basic regional results in perhaps the most transparent way.   It reports the 
results  of  univariate  regressions  of  regional  income  on  its  possible  determinants,  all  with  country 
dummies.  Such specifications are loaded in favor of each variable seeming important since it does not 
compete with any other variable.  We report both the within country and between countries R
2 of these 
regressions.    The first column shows that education explains 58% of between country variation of per 
capita income, and 38% of within country variation of per capita income.  Figure 2 shows, for Brazil, 
Colombia,  India,  and  Russia  the  striking  raw  correlation  between  regional  schooling  and  per  capita 
income.  The results are qualitatively similar if we use the fraction of the population with a high school 
degree  or  that  with  a  college  degree.    Regional  population  explains  only  3%  of  between  country 
variation of per capita income and 1% of within country variation of per capita income.   
Although  several  other  variables  in  Table  2  explain  a  significant  share  of  between  country 
variation, none comes close to education in explaining within country variation in income per capita. 
Starting with geographical variables, temperature and inverse distance to coast – taken individually – 
explain 27 and 13 percent of between country income variation, but 1 and 4 percent respectively of 
within country variation.  Oil reserves explain a trivial amount of variation at either level.   The index of 
institutional quality explains 25% of cross-country variation, consistent with the empirical findings at the 
cross-country level such as King and Levine (1993) or Acemoglu et al. (2001), but the index explains 0% 
of within country variation of per capita incomes.  Although some of the individual components of the 
index, such as access to finance or the number of days it takes to file a tax return, explain as much as 
25% of cross-country variation, none explains more than 2% of within country variation of per capita 25 
 
incomes (see online appendix).
20  Cultural variables account for a substantial share of between country 
variation but none accounts for much of within country variation.   Of course, culture might operate at 
the national rather than the sub -national level, although we note that much of the research on trust 
focuses on regional rather than national differences (e.g., Putnam 1993).   
Tables 3 and 4 show the multivariate regression results at the national and regional level.  Table 
3 presents regressions of national per capita income on geography and education, controlling in some 
instances for population or employment, as suggested by our model.  At the country level, temperature, 
inverse distance to coast, and oil endowment are all highly statistically significant in explaining cross -
country variation in incomes, and together explain an impressive 50% of the variance.  Education is also 
statistically significant, with a coefficient of .26, raising the R
2 to 63%.  Next we add, one at a time, two 
measures of institutions (our index and expropriation risk) and two measures of culture  (trust in others 
and the number of ethnic groups).  Education remains highly statistically significant in each specification, 
and its coefficient does not fall much.  At the country level, both institutional quality and expropriation 
risk are statistically significant with coefficients of 0.32 and 0.36, respectively.  In contrast, proxies for 
culture are statistically insignificant.  The final specification combines geography, education, institutions, 
and culture in one regression.   Although we lose roughly two thirds of the observations, there are no 
surprising  results:  the coefficient on years of education drops to 0.15 but remains the most powerful 
predictor of GDP per capita, while distance to the coast, oil reserves, and risk of expropriation are also 
statistically significant, although their combined explanatory power is low.    
The last two rows of Table 3 show the adjusted R
2 of each regression if we omit the institutional 
(or cultural) variable, as well as the adjusted R
2 if we omit education.   The impact on R
2 of dropping 
education ranges from a sharp reduction in the specifications that controls for the quality of institutions 
                                                           
20 Consistent with the results on institutions, two indicators of infrastructure – density of power lines and travel 
time between cities—explain a good deal more of the cross-country than of within-country variation (see online 
appendix).  Density of power lines account for 36% of cross country variation but only 5% of within country 
variation.  Travel time accounts for 15% of cross country variation but only 7% of within country variation. 26 
 
and the number of ethnic groups (columns 3 and 6) to a modest  increase in the specification that 
includes risk of expropriation (column 4).  The risk of expropriation has a 76% sample correlation with 
years of schooling.  These results illustrate the difficulty of disentangling the effect of institutions and 
human capital in cross-country regressions (see Glaeser et al. 2004).
21   
Table 4 presents the corresponding results at the regional level, including country fixed effects.   
Among  the  geography  variables,  inverse  distance  to  coast  is  the  most  robust  predictor  of  regional 
income per capita.  The education coefficient is slightly higher than in Table 3, and is highly significant, 
as illustrated in Figure 35.  When we include our proxies for institutions and culture one at a time, we 
find a small adverse effect of ethnic heterogeneity on income and no effect of the quality of institutions 
or of trust in others.
22   Institutional quality is insignificant and its incremental explanatory power is tiny.  
Combining our proxies for human capital, institutions and culture in one specification, we find that the 
coefficient on years of education rises from 0.27 to 0.37 and is highly significant while inverse distance 
to the coast is the only other variable that is statistically significant (at the 10% level).   The last four 
rows of Table 4 show the within and between country adjusted R
2 of each regression if we omit the 
institutional or cultural variable, as well as the analog statistics if we omit education.  While geography, 
institutions, and culture jointly explain a respectable fraction of the cross-country variation, they explain 
at most 16 percent of the within-country variation.  In contrast, education explains a large fraction of 
the variance both across and within countries.   
The final regression in Table 4 addresses the concern that the coefficient on education is biased 
because richer regions invest more in education.  To address this simultaneity bias, we include in the 
                                                           
21 Risk of expropriation has the highest explanatory power among standard measures of institutions, such as 
constraints on the executive, proportional representation, and corruption (see the online appendix). 
22 The region’s ranking in the Doing Business report is the only component of the quality of institutions variable 
that  is  statistically  significant  but  its  incremental  explanatory  power  is  tiny  (see  online  appendix).    In  results 
reported  in  the  online  appendix,  we  also  find  a  small  adverse  effect  of  travel  time  but  no  role  for  other 
infrastructure variables such as the density of power lines.  Finally, we find no role for cultural variables such as 
linguistic fractionalization and civic values.  27 
 
regression years of education for the population over 65 years old rather than for the population over 
14 years as we do in all other regressions.  The results show that the estimated coefficient on years of 
education for the population over 65 years old is highly statistically significant and only marginally lower 
than the coefficient of the standard measure of education in column 2 (0.25 vs. 0.28).  Although this 
strategy does not fully address endogeneity concerns – some long run factors may determine both past 
regional schooling and current income – it nonetheless provides a useful robustness check with respect 
to the effects of recent economic growth.   We further discuss the omitted variable bias when we 
present firm-level regressions in the next section.      
We have conducted several robustness checks of our basic findings, and here summarize them 
but do not present the results.  First, we have estimated separate regressions for countries above and 
below the median GDP per capita to examine whether the relationship between regional income and 
human capital is different for developed and developing countries.  Consistent with the cross-country 
findings of Barro (1991) and Krueger and Lindahl (2001), the estimated coefficient on years of education 
is typically higher for richer countries.  Second, we eliminated regions that include national capitals from 
the  regressions;  the  results  are  not  materially  affected.    Third,  we  included  measures  of  regional 
population  density  in  the  specifications;  density  is  typically  insignificant  and  other  results  are  not 
importantly affected.  Fourth, we have tested the robustness of these results using data on regional 
luminosity instead of per capita income (see Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil 2011 and 2012).  The 
results are consistent with the evidence we have described, with respect to the importance of human 
capital, and the relative unimportance of other factors, in accounting for cross-regional differences.   
The  low  explanatory  power  of  institutions  is  puzzling.    The  measures we  use  (but  also  the 
components of the aggregate index) are standard and theoretically appropriate.  In general, subjective 
assessments  correlate  much  better  with  measures  of  development  than  objective  measures  of 
institutions (Glaeser et al. 2004).  Even subjective assessments of institutions have low explanatory 28 
 
power in the sample of developing countries covered by the Enterprise Survey (see online appendix).  
The weakness of institutional variables may result in part from different data and in part from the fact 
that institutions may be important at the national, but not at the regional level (see Table 3). 
Due to potential migration of better educated workers to more productive regions, we cannot 
interpret the large education coefficients - which appear to come through with a similar magnitude 
across a range of specifications – as the causal impact of human capital on regional income.  We next 
estimate the role of human capital in the production function by looking at firm level evidence based on 
Enterprise Surveys, which allows us to partially address this problem by including region fixed effects as 
well as by taking advantage of panel data.  By combining estimation and calibration, we then assess the 
extent to which the role of human capital at the firm level can account for its role across regions. 
 
V.  Establishment-Level Evidence. 
In Table 5, we turn to the micro evidence and estimate essentially Equation (17).   We use the 
Enterprise Survey data described in Section III.   We estimate OLS regressions using a single cross-section 
of 6,314 firms in 20 countries and panel regressions using 2,922 firms in 7 countries.
23  We report results 
using a rough measure of value added, namely the logarithm of sales net of raw material and energy 
inputs, as the dependent variable.
24  We use the log of the number of employees as a proxy for of li,j. We 
measure capital (which includes both land Ti,j and physical capital Ki,j) by the log of property, plant and 
equipment but also use the log of expenditure on energy as a proxy for it.  We also include firm-level 
controls such as age, number of establishments, exports, and equity ownership by foreigners. 
                                                           
23 Panel data for two of the countries in our sample (Brazil and Malawi) is available but we can’t use it because 
data on schooling is missing for one of the years. 
24 Results are qualitatively similar if we use the log of sales as the dependent variable (see online appendix).  29 
 
Most important, to trace out the effects of human capital, we include the years of schooling of 
the manager SE, the years of schooling of workers SW , and the average years of schooling in the region 
Si.  We thus implicitly assume that the establishment’s top manager plays the role of the entrepreneur 
in our Lucas-Lucas model.  As we explained in Section II, the Mincer model implies that schooling should 
enter the specification in levels, rather than in logs. We include geographic variables to control for 
exogenous differences in productivity.
25  To capture scale effects in regional externalities, we control for 
the log of the region’s population Li.   
In Table 5, we begin with three OLS specifications.   In the most parsimonious specification in 
the  first  column,  we  include  proxies  for  geography  and  regional  education,  worker  and  manager 
schooling, log number of employees, log of property, plant, and equipment, and industry fixed effects 
(for 16 industries).  Errors are clustered at the regional level.  The estimated coefficient on capital is only 
0.24 while the estimated coefficient on labor is .86.  To address concerns over measurement error, the 
second specification adds the log of energy expenditure as a proxy for physical capital.   The estimated 
coefficient on labor drops to 0.68 while the sum of the estimated coefficients on capital and energy is 
0.42.  The third specification adds to the previous one four firm-level controls, namely log firm age, a 
dummy variable if the firm has multiple establishments, the percentage of sales that are exported, and 
the percentage of the equity owned by foreigners.  These firm-level controls have the expected signs 
and are highly statistically significant.  Yet, including these controls does not materially change any of 
the coefficients of interest.     
Depending on the specification, the coefficient on management schooling ranges from 0.026 to 
0.015 while the coefficient on worker schooling takes values between .017 and .015.  The similarity in 
                                                           
25 Consistent with the findings for regional data, measures of regional institutions and infrastructure are usually 
insignificant, and hence we do not focus on these results.  The coefficient on management schooling may be 
biased insofar as our regional proxies leave out much of the variation in Ai.  To address this issue, we estimate (17) 
by controlling for the full set of region x industry dummies.  The results on years of schooling of managers and 
workers are robust to including region x industry fixed effects (see online appendix).     30 
 
the magnitude of the management and worker schooling coefficients drives our calibration exercise.  In 
the context of Equation (17), this implies that (1–ʱ–β–ʴ) E  is roughly equal to ʱ W  .  The return on 
entrepreneurial schooling must thus be substantially higher than that on worker schooling because the 
labor share ʱ is typically much higher than the entrepreneurial share (1–ʱ–β–ʴ).  
The coefficient on regional schooling is statistically significant across specifications and varies in 
a narrow range between .07 and .09.  In so far as there is large measurement error in workers’ schooling 
at the firm level, regional education may provide a more precise proxy for workers’ skills, creating a false 
impression of human capital externalities.  This, however, is unlikely to be the case since the average 
education of workers does not vary much across firms within regions.  Consistent with agglomeration 
economies, the coefficient on regional population is positive, ranging from .10 and .12 depending on the 
specification.   Finally, the coefficients on geography variables are generally insignificant.   Thus, the 
most obvious proxies for omitted regional productivity do not appear to be important.  These results on 
geography should partially address the concern that regional schooling picks up the effect of omitted 
regional productivity.  Still, other endogeneity issues may contaminate our estimates of externalities.  In 
Section VI, we perform a calibration exercise intended to quantify the importance of the coefficients on 
regional human capital and population for explaining income variation across space.     
In the OLS results in Table 5, the coefficients on production inputs (including managerial and 
worker education) may be biased by unobservable differences in firm-level productivity.  In the last 
column of Table 5, we follow Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) panel data approach and use expenditure on 
energy to control for the unobserved correlation between production inputs and productivity.
26 This 
estimation strategy provides a way to control for the selection of managers and workers into more 
productive firms.  Our sample contains  at most three observations per  establishment and the average 
                                                           
26 Specifically, we use the “levpet” command in STATA (see Petrin et al., 2004). We assume that labor inputs are 
flexible while property, plant, and equipment are not.    31 
 
number of observations per establishment is only 1.2, so these panel data results should be interpreted 
with caution.  None of the regional variables come in significant, most likely because we only have panel 
data for 22 regions in 7 countries.  Turning to the firm-level variables, the results are consistent with our 
earlier findings. The coefficient on labor is .62 while that on property, plant, and equipment is .34.   The 
estimated coefficients on managerial and worker schooling are close to their respective OLS levels:  the 
coefficient on management schooling rises to .027 from .015 under OLS while the coefficient on worker 
schooling rises to .032 from .015 under OLS. 
We added additional controls to these regressions, and obtained similar results, including similar 
parameter estimates as those in Table 5.  There does not appear to be much evidence of significant 
omitted regional effects, although since we do not have all of the determinants of regional productivity, 
our assessment of external effects might be exaggerated.  As a robustness check, we re-estimated the 
panel regression in Table 5 using the methodology of Olley and Pakes (1996).  Since establishments with 
zero investment are excluded from the analysis, the number of observations drops from 2,922 to 1,426.   
Nevertheless, the estimated coefficients on management and worker education are qualitatively similar 
to our basic findings (0.0367 vs. 0.0256 and 0.0236 vs 0.0265, respectively).  Ackerberg et al. (2006) raise 
concerns about the identification of the coefficients on flexible inputs in the Levinsohn-Petrin, and to a 
lesser  extent  Olley-Pakes,  procedures.    Although  it  is  reassuring  that  both  procedures  yield  similar 
results, we cannot fully address these concerns given the small number of establishments with multiple 
observations.
27  We return to this in the calibration exercise.  
In  light  of  this  evidence,  it  is  interesting  to  go  back  to  the  regional  data  and  ask:  If 
entrepreneurs/managers are so important in determining  firm-level  productivity, can we also find 
evidence of their influence on regional income?  To address this issue, Table 6 uses an approach similar 
to that in Table 4, but estimates the correlation between regional GDP per capita, the  composition of 
                                                           
27 We could estimate OLS regressions with firm fixed-effects.  However, very few establishments have more than 
one observation and within-establishment variation in the education of the top manager over time is very limited.    32 
 
human capital and the structure of the workforce.  We run regressions with and without years of 
education but always include the standard geography controls.   We first examine whether the share of 
the population with a college degree –a measure of skilled labor—plays a special role (Vanderbussche et 
al. 2006).   To this end, we divide the population in each region according to their highest educational 
attainment into three groups:  (1) less than high school, (2) high school, and (3) college or higher.  We 
then include in the regressions the share of the population with high school and, separately, that with 
college degree (the omitted category is the population with less than high school).    To make the 
estimated coefficients comparable to those for years of education in Table 4, we multiply the shares of 
the population with college and high school degrees by 16 and 12, respectively (their weights in our 
standard measure of years of education).   The estimated coefficient is higher for the (scaled) share of 
the population with college than with high school (0.25 vs. 0.20) but cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the two coefficients are equal (the F-statistic is 1.28).    
Although it cannot be interpreted as causal evidence, Table 5 documents – consistent with our 
model – a positive correlation between regional income and the share of educated workers becoming 
managers.   We use data on the fraction of the workforce classified by the census as directors and 
officers  to  explore  this  prediction.    The  data  is  noisy  because  occupational  categories  are  not 
standardized across countries and data is available for only 28 countries (not all countries have census 
data online and not all censuses have detailed occupational data).  With these caveats in mind, we find 
that, controlling for the percentage of the population with college and high school, increasing by one 
percentage point the fraction of the workforce classified as directors and officers is associated with an 
8% increase in GDP per capita.  This finding is robust to including the level of education.   Focusing on 
the share of directors and officers that also have a college degree yields similar results: a percentage 
point increase in the fraction of college-educated directors and officers is associated with an increase in 
GDP  per  capita  of  11%  to  12%,  depending  on  the  specification.      Consistent  with  our  model,  the 33 
 
incidence of doctors and government bureaucrats is uncorrelated with regional income per capita (see 
online appendix).   
As an alternative way of looking at occupations, we include in the regressions the share of the 
workforce classified as employers.   The results for employers suggest that increasing by one percentage 
point the share of employers in the workforce is associated with a 3 percent increase in GDP per capita 
when we control for educational attainment but the estimated coefficient drops in value (from 0.03 to 
0.02) and becomes insignificant when we control for the level of education.   
  
VI.  Calibration.  
Can the effects estimated from firm level regressions account for the large role of schooling in 
the  regional  regressions?  How  do  these  effects  compare  with  the  calibrations  performed  in 
development  accounting?    We  first  discuss  the  predictions  of  our  model  under  a  set  of  standard 
calibration values for the labor share α, the capital share (ʴ + β), and the housing income share θ, but 
also consider a range of parameter values (particularly for the labor share α).  The standard calibration 
for  the  U.S.  labour  share  is  about  α  =.6.    We  however  calibrate  α  =.55 to  reflect  the  fact  that  in 
developing countries the labour share tends to be lower than in the U.S., in part because a fraction of 
labour income remunerates entrepreneurship (Gollin 2002).  This number is close to the estimate of the 
labour share obtained from our firm level regressions (where α is around .6).  For our exercise, we focus 
on the value calibrated using national account statistics, and thus target α =.55 as our main benchmark. 
We however perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to different values of α.      
We follow the standard calibration for the overall capital share and set it to .35, which falls 
between our firm level and panel estimates.  These calibrations imply that managerial/entrepreneurial 
input accounts for (1–ʱ–β–ʴ) = (1–.55–.35) =.1 of value added. 
From our estimated regressions we impose the following restrictions: 34 
 
i)  α W  =.03 and (1–ʱ–β–ʴ) E  =.025  (from Table 5, column 4). 
ii)  γ = .05 (from Table 5, column 4) 
iii)   γ ψ  = .074 (from Table 5, columns 1,2,3) 
iv)  γ – β/(1 – δ) =.01 (from Table 4, column 2) 
v)  [1+ γψ –β/(1 – δ)]
 =.27 (from Table 4, column 2) 
These specifications should not be viewed as “structural estimates” of model parameters, but rather as 
a means of finding what parameter values are in the ballpark of our regressions estimates.  Note that 
our starting estimates for regional externalities in the firm level regressions do not come from the 
Levinsohn-Petrin method, which yields zero.  We come back to this issue below.   
Using these calibrated parameters, the above equations can be solved to yield: 
W  = .055;  E   = .25 ;   = .20;  ʴ = .32;  ψ = 7.25;  β = .03; 
At these parameter values, the spatial equilibrium is stable, since (β – ψγ)(1 – θ) + θ(1 – ʴ) =  (-.33)(.6) + 
(.4)(.68)>0.    Interestingly,  some  of  these  parameter  values  fall  in  the  ballpark  of  existing  micro-
estimates.  The  land  share  β  is  just  below  estimates  based  on  income  accounts  (Valentinyi  and 
Herrendorf 2008).  The return to worker schooling of 5-6% is consistent with micro evidence on workers’ 
Mincerian  returns  (Psacharopoulos  1994).    This  finding  suggests  that  our  firm  level  productivity 
regressions reduce identification problems at least as far as firm-level variables are concerned.  Indeed, 
note that in i) our estimates of the return to education are assessed independently from our coefficient 
estimates for externalities, which are subject to more severe endogeneity concerns.    
The critical new finding is that our estimation results point to a Mincerian return  E   = .25 for 
entrepreneurs.  This 25% estimate is higher than those found by Goldin and Katz (2008) for returns to 
college education for workers.  However, entrepreneurial returns might be ignored in surveys focusing 
on wages as returns to education.  The few existing analyses of entrepreneurial education document 35 
 
substantially higher returns to education for managers than for workers (Parker and van Praag 2006, van 
Praag et al. 2009).
28  The high returns to entrepreneurial education, compared to the relatively  low 
returns to worker education, might explain the difficulty encountered by the development accounting 
literature when trying to use human capital to explain productivity differences across space (Caselli 
2005, Hsieh and Klenow 2010).  Individuals selected into entrepreneurship appear to have vastly more 
human capital than workers, driving up productivity.   Of course, entrepreneurial talent may be more 
important than schooling in explaining this finding.  Our analysis cannot address this issue (which would 
require better data and an endogenous determination of the connection between schooling and talent), 
but it still identifies a critical role of management and entrepreneurship in determining productivity. 
 The  spatial differences in the stocks of human capit al implied solely by returns to worker 
education are considerably lower than those implied by blended returns of workers and entrepreneurs. 
The average population-wide Mincerian return    of 20% is in fact substantially above the return to 
workers, and lies in between our estimates of workers’ and entrepreneurs’ values.
29   
Consider now the role of externalities.  The education externality parameter ψ we use is 7.25, 
although recall that Levinsohn-Petrin estimate is zero.  This implies that a given increase in regional 
human capital generates 7.25 times more externalities if it is due to an increase in the average amount 
of human capital than to a larger number of people with average education.  These estimates imply that 
                                                           
28  Using  U.S.  and  Dutch  individual-level  data,  these  studies  find  that  one  extra  year  of  schooling  increases 
entrepreneurial income by 18% and 14%, respectively.  This is much higher than the 3% found in our firm-level 
data (in our model entrepreneurial income is a constant share of a firm’s output), implying gigantic Mincerian 
returns under an entrepreneurial share of .1.  Note, however, that these studies rely on small start-ups (in the 
Dutch data) or on self employed individuals (in the U.S. data). In both cases, the entrepreneurial share is likely to 
be higher than .1, moving Mincerian returns closer to our benchmark  of 25%. Millan et al (2011) also find a 
complementarity between entrepreneurial return and education in a locality where entrepreneurs operate.  
29Although we  lack direct data on the number of entrepreneurs in the economy, we can ma ke a back-of-the-
envelope calculation to assess whether our firm level evidence is consistent with a population-wide 20% Mincerian 
return. If: (1) an average entrepreneur is as educated as the entrepreneurs in the enterprise survey on average, i.e. 
has 14 years of schooling; and (2) an average worker in the economy is as educated as the average worker in the 
sample, i.e. has roughly 7 years of schooling, then to obtain an average population-wide Mincerian return of 20% 
entrepreneurs need to account for 10.14% of the workforce.  Formally, the  fraction of entrepreneurs f solves the 
equation:  . ) 055 . * 7 exp( * ) 1 ( ) 25 . * 14 exp( * ))] 1 ( * 7 * 14 ( * 2 . 0 exp[ f f f f       36 
 
raising the educational level from the sample mean of 6.58 years by one year increases regional TFP by 
about 7.56%.   The magnitude of human capital externalities has been heavily discussed in the literature.  
As Lange and Topel (2006) indicate in their survey, the results have been fairly diverse.  For instance, 
Caselli (2005) and Ciccone and Peri (2006) find externalities to be unimportant.  Rauch (1993) estimates 
a 3-5% effect, somewhat lower than our estimate.  Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) estimate that a one 
year increase in average schooling is associated with a 1-3% increase in average wages.   Moretti (2004) 
examines the impact of spillovers associated with the share of college graduates living in a city and finds 
that a 1-percent increase in the share of college graduates in the population leads to an increase in 
output of roughly half a percentage point.   By way of comparison, under our variable definitions, a 1-
percent increase in the share of college graduates in the population is associated with (at most) an 
additional .16 years of education and thus with a 1.2% (=.16x0.075) increase in regional TFP.  Iranzo and 
Peri  (2009)  estimate  that  one  extra  year  of  college  per  worker  increase  the  state’s  TFP  by  a  very 
significant and large 6-9%, whereas the effect of an extra year of high school is closer to 0-1%.  These 
estimates suggest a potentially sizeable effect of schooling for productivity via social interactions or R&D 
spillovers, consistent with Lucas (1985, 20098) as well as with the literature in urban economics (e.g., 
Glaeser and Mare 2001, Glaeser and Gottlieb 2009).  Externalities (whose empirical identification is 
admittedly much harder) may also improve the explanatory power of human capital, although we show 
below that they only help a lot when entrepreneurial returns are high. 
We now assess the explanatory power of entrepreneurial inputs and externalities by using our 
parameter estimates to perform a standard development accounting exercise.  To do so, define a factor-




δ+β, which is national income predicted by our 
model when: i) all regions in a country are identical and all countries are equally productive, and ii) in 
line  with  standard  development  accounting  we  consider  only  physical  and  human  capital,  thereby 
attributing land rents to physical capital.  This model with no regional mobility provides a benchmark to 37 
 
assess the role of physical and human capital when productivity differences are absent. Following Caselli 








where Y is observed GDP per worker.  Using Caselli’s dataset, the observed variance of (log) GDP per 
worker is 1.32.  Ignoring human capital externalities (i.e., assuming ψ=γ=0) and using the standard 8% 
average Mincerian return on human capital for both workers and entrepreneurs (i.e., setting   =8%), 
the  variance  of  log(  ̂)  equals  0.76,  i.e.  physical  and  human  capital  explain  57%  (0.76/1.32)  of  the 
observed variation in income per worker.  This calculation reproduces the standard finding that, under 
standard Mincerian returns, a big chunk of the cross country income variation is accounted for by the 
productivity residual.   
To  isolate  the  role  of  entrepreneurial  capital,  we  compute  Ŷ  assuming  no  human  capital 
externalities (i.e., ψ=γ=0) while still keeping a population-wide Mincerian return of 20%, consistent 
with our firm-level estimates.   It is not surprising that average Mincerian returns of about 20% greatly 
improve the explanatory power of human capital.  Indeed, under this assumption success rises to 81%.  
This improvement is solely due to accounting for managerial schooling.  We note that this result is quite 
sensitive to our assumption of labor share of 55%.   If the labor share were lower, the residual income 
share  allocated  to  entrepreneurial  rents  would  be  correspondingly  higher.    This  would  reduce  our 
estimate  of  the  returns  to  entrepreneurial  education,  and  therefore  of  average  Mincerian  returns.      
Finally,  to  assess  the  incremental  explanatory  power  of  human  capital  externalities,  we  compute 
Ŷ assuming  our  estimated  values  (i.e.,  ψ=7.25  and  γ=.05),  while  retaining  the  assumption  that  the 
average Mincerian return equals 20%.   Under these new assumptions, the model generates too much 
productivity variation, and success rises to 103%.  38 
 
Table 7 presents sensitivity results for the calibration exercise in this section.  We focus on the 
predictions of the model when the labor share ranges between 50 and 60 percent while keeping the 
capital share β+δ constant at 35 percent, i.e. increases in the labor share of workers are offset by 
reductions in the labor share of entrepreneurs.  Panel A presents results under the assumption that both 
(1–ʱ–β–ʴ) E  and ʱ W  equal to 0.03, while Panel B presents results under the assumption that they 
equal 0.02.  In both panels, we assume that entrepreneurs are 5% of the workforce and have 14 years of 
education while workers have 7 years.  We continue to use γ=.05, ψ=7.25, β=.03, and ʴ=.32.   Table 7 
shows that the average Mincerian return increases sharply with ʱ.  As ʱ rises from 50 to 60 percent, the 
average Mincerian return rises from 11 to 74 percent in Panel A (i.e., when ʱ W  =.03) and from 6 to 37 
percent in Panel B (i.e., when ʱ W  =.02).   These changes in Mincerian returns take place because  E 
compounds during 14 years and it triples as the labor share rises from 50 to 60, while  W  compounds 
for 7 years and falls modestly (from 6 to 5 percent in Panel A and from 4 to 3.3 percent in Panel B).    
It is clear from Table 7 that  E  needs to be high (i.e. in excess of 25%) for our model to add 
meaningful explanatory power beyond that of models that do not account for entrepreneurial inputs.  
Externalities play second fiddle; they have a minor impact on the success ratio when  E   is low and, 
conversely, they only come into play when   E 
 
is high.  This raises the question of how plausible are 
high levels of  E  .  To assess this issue, Table 7 reports the ratio of the entrepreneur-to-worker income 
for different Mincerian returns.  When E   is 25%, the entrepreneur-to-worker income ratio equals 22.3 
in Panel A and 25.9 in Panel B.  This ratio rises to 73.1 in Panel A and 83.9 in Panel B when  E   equals to 
33%.   Such levels of income inequality seem plausible for developing countries (Towers and Perrin 
2005).  In contrast, income inequality is too low when  E  is 20% (i.e. 10.8x and 12.7x).   39 
 
To appreciate the importance of entrepreneurial inputs in understanding cross-country income 
difference, compare Mozambique and the US.  Income per worker is roughly 33 times higher in the US 
than in Mozambique ($57,259 vs. $1,752), while the stock of physical capital per capita is 185 times 
higher in the US than in Mozambique ($125,227 vs. $676).  The average number of years of schooling for 
the population 15 years and older is 1.01 years Mozambique and 12.69 years in the United States.  
These large differences in schooling imply that the (per capita) stock of human capital is 10.3 higher 
(HUS/HMOZ=e
.20*(12.69-1.01))  in  the  US  than  in  Mozambique  if  the  average  Mincerian  return  is  20%.    In 
contrast, the (per capita) stock of human capital is only 2.5 times higher (HUS/HDRC=e
.08*(12.69-1.01)) in the US 
than in Mozambique if the average Mincerian return is 8%.  Using weights of 1/3 and 2/3 for physical 
and human capital, these differences in physical and human capital imply that income per capita should 
be 27 times higher in the US than in Mozambique (27 = 10.3
2/3x185
1/3), which is much closer to the 
actual value of 33 times than the 10.6 multiple implied by 8% Mincerian return (10.6=2.5
2/3x185
1/3). 
In sum, our firm level and regional regressions suggest that: i) in line with the development 
accounting literature, workers’ human capital is an important but not a large contributor to productivity 
differences,  ii)  entrepreneurial  inputs  area  fundamental  and  relatively  neglected  channel  for 
understanding  the  role  of  schooling  in  shaping  productivity  differences,  and  iii)  human  capital 
externalities may magnify the impact of entrepreneurial inputs.  Our parameter estimates point to very 
large returns to entrepreneurial schooling (perhaps due to entrepreneurs’ general talent) and to large 
social returns to education at the regional level. 
 
VII.  Conclusion. 
Evidence  from  more  than  1,500  sub-national  regions  of  the  world  suggests  that  regional 
education is a critical determinant of regional development, and the only such determinant that explains 
a substantial share of regional variation.   Using data on several thousand firms located in these regions, 40 
 
we  have  also  found  that  regional  education  influences  regional  development  through  education  of 
workers, education of entrepreneurs, and perhaps regional externalities.  The latter come primarily from 
the level of education (the quality of human capital) in a region, and not from its total quantity (the 
number of people with some education).     
A simple Cobb-Douglas production function specification used in development accounting would 
have difficulty accounting for all this evidence.  As an alternative, we presented a Lucas-Lucas model of 
an  economy, which  combines  the  allocation of  talent  between work  and  entrepreneurship,  human 
capital externalities, and migration of labor across regions within a country.  The empirical findings we 
presented are both consistent with the general predictions of this model, and provide plausible values of 
the model’s parameters.  In addition, we follow Caselli (2005) in assessing the ability of the model to 
account  for  variation  of  output  per  worker  across  countries.      The  central  message  of  the 
estimation/calibration exercise is that, while private returns to worker education are modest and close 
to previous estimates, private returns to entrepreneurial education (in the form of profits) and possibly 
also  social  returns  to  education  through  external  spillovers,  are  large.    To  the  extent  that  earlier 
estimates of return to education have missed the benefits of educated managers/entrepreneurs, they 
may have underestimated the returns to education.   
Our data points directly to the role of the supply of educated entrepreneurs for the creation and 
productivity of firms.  From the point of view of development accounting, having such entrepreneurs 
seems more important than having educated workers.  Consistent with earlier observations of Banerjee 
and  Duflo  (2005)  and  La  Porta  and  Shleifer  (2008),  economic  development  occurs  in  regions  that 
concentrate entrepreneurs, who run productive firms. These entrepreneurs may also contribute to the 
exchange of ideas, leading so significant regional externalities. The observed large benefits of education 
through  the  creation  of  a  supply  of  entrepreneurs  and  through  externalities  offer  an  optimistic 
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Appendix 1. 
Solution of the Model and proof of Proposition 1  
Given Equation (6) for regional output, we can determine wages, profits, and capital rental rates as a 
function of regional factor supplies via the usual (private) marginal product pricing.  That is: 
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Thus, profit πi(h) is equal to πi (the marginal product of the entrepreneur’s human capital in region i), 
times the entrepreneur’s human capital h, namely πi(h) = πi∙h. 
By exploiting the breakdown of human capital into its different components in Equation (7), one 



































Using this condition and Equation (3), it is easy to see that the relative wage is given by Equation (9).   
Consider now the determinant of spatial mobility.  By A.1, labour moves from unproductive to 
productive  regions.  Formally,  Equation  (11)  implies that  an  agent  with  human  capital hj migrates if 
     U j U P j P H h w H h w / / ) (
1 1     , where φ captures migration costs. This identifies a human capital 
threshold hm such that agent j migrates if and only if hj ≥ hm. By exploiting the wage equation in (6) and 




































1  .                                                        (Ap.1) 
To pin down the equilibrium, note that the aggregate resource constraint is given by: 
p∙HP + (1 – p)∙HU  = H.                                                            (Ap.2) 48 
 
After accounting for externalities, the equilibrium condition (Ap.1) can be written as:  
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.                                                (Ap.5) 
Under full mobility (φ = 0), using (Ap.3) one finds that the equilibrium is determined by the condition: 
















































































































  .          (Ap.6) 
The left hand side is decreasing in HP.  If (β - ψγ)(1- θ) + θ(1- ʴ)> 0, the right hand side - which captures 
the cost of migrating to productive regions, increases in HP.  As a result, when (β - ψγ)(1- θ) + θ(1- ʴ)> 0 
even under full mobility in the stable equilibrium there is no universal migration to productive regions. 
Indeed, if all human capital moves to productive regions, then HP = H/p and the right hand side of 
(Ap.10) becomes infinite. Full migration is not an equilibrium. No migration is not an equilibrium either, 
as in this case A.1 implies that (Ap.10) cannot hold.  When ψ = 1 (and φ = 0) the equilibrium has: 
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When (β - ψγ)(1- θ) + θ(1- ʴ)> 0, an increase in HP (holding H constant) shifts down the left hand side 
and shifts up the right hand side above. As a result, the equilibrium is unique.   
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Appendix 2– Definitions and sources for the variables used in the paper 
This table provides the names, definitions and sources of all the variables used in the tables of the paper. 
Variable  Description  Sources and links 
I. GDP per capita, population, employment and human capital 
 
Income per capita  Income per capita in PPP constant 2005 international dollars in the region in 2005.  We GDP as a 
measure of income for all countries except 20. For those 20 countries, we use data on income (6 
countries),  expenditure  (8  countries),  wages  (3  countries),  gross  value  added  (2  countries),  and 
consumption,  investment  and  government  expenditure  (1  country).    For  each  country,  we  scale 
regional  income  per  capita  values  so  that  their  population-weighted  sum  equals  the  World 
Development Indicators (WDI) value of Gross Domestic Product in PPP constant 2005 international 
dollars. Similarly, for each country, we adjust the regional population values so that their sum equals 
the  country-level  analog  in  WDI.    For  years  with  missing  regional  income  per  capita  data,  we 
interpolate using all available data for the period 1990-2008.  When interpolating income values is 
not  possible,  we  use  the  regional  distribution  of  the  closest  year  with  regional  income  data. 
Population data for years without census data is interpolated and extrapolated from the available 
census  data  for  the  period  1990-2008.  At  the  country  level,  we  calculate  this  variable  as  the 
population-weighted average of regional income. 
 
Regional Income:  See online appendix 
"Appendix GDP Sources". 
Regional population:  Thomas Brinkhoff: 
City Population, 
http://www.citypopulation.de/ 
Country-level GDP per capita and PPP 
exchange rates: World Bank, (2010). Data 
retrieved on March 2, 2010, from World 
Development Indicators Online (WDI) 
database,  
http://go.worldbank.org/6HAYAHG8H0 
Years of education  The average years of schooling from primary school onwards for the population aged 15 years or 
older. Data for China and Georgia is for the population 6 years and older. We use the most recent 
information  available  for  the  period  1990-2006.  To  make  levels  of  educational  attainment 
comparable  across  countries,  we  translate  educational  statistics  into  the  International  Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED) standard and use UNESCO data on the duration of school levels in 
each country for the year for which we have educational attainment data.  Eurostat aggregates data 
for ISCED levels 0-2 and we assign such observations an ISCED level 1.  Following Barro and Lee 
(1993): (1) we assign zero years of schooling to ISCED level 0 (i.e., pre-primary); (2) we assign zero 
years of additional schooling to (a) ISCED level 4 (i.e., vocational), and (b) ISCED level 6 (i.e. post-
graduate); and (3) we assign 4 years of additional schooling to ISCED level 5 (i.e. graduate). Since 
regional data is not available for all countries, unlike Barro and Lee (1993), we assign zero years of 
additional schooling: (a) to all incomplete levels; and (b) to ISCED level 2 (i.e. lower secondary).  Thus, 
the average years of schooling in a region is calculated as: (1) the product of the fraction of people 
whose highest attainment level is ISCED 1 or 2 and the duration of ISCED 1; plus (2) the product of the 
fraction of people whose highest attainment level is ISCED 3 or 4 and the cumulative duration of 
ISCED 3; plus (3) the product of the fraction of people whose highest attainment level is ISCED 5 or 6 
and the sum of the cumulative duration of ISCED 3 plus 4 years. At the country level, we calculate this 
variable as the population-weighted average of the regional values. 
See online appendix "Appendix on 
Education Sources".    









Share Pop with high 
school degree  
Share of the population aged 15 years or older whose highest educational level is ISCED 3 or 4.   
 
See Years of education. 
 
Share Pop with 
college degree 
Share of the population aged 15 years or older whose highest educational level is ISCED 5 or 6. 
 
See Years of education. 
 
Years of education 
65+ 
The average years of schooling from primary school onwards for the population aged 65 years or 
older. To compute this variable, we follow the same procedure as used for the previously described 




Ln(Population)  The logarithm of the number of inhabitants in the region in 2005. Population data for years without 
census data is interpolated and extrapolated from the available census data for the period 1990-
2008. For each country, we adjust the regional populations so that the sum of regional populations 
equals the country-level analog in the World Development Indicators (WDI).  At the country level, we 
calculate this variable following the same methodology but using country boundaries. 
 Regional population: Thomas Brinkhoff: 
City Population, 
http://www.citypopulation.de/ 
Regional spherical: Collins-Bartholomew 




 % Directors and 
officers in workforce  
Percentage  of  the  economically-active  population  aged  15  years  through  65  that  most  closely 
matches the employment category of company officers and general directors in the most recent 




% Directors and 
officers with a college 
degree 
Percentage of the economically-active population aged 15 years through 65 with a college degree 
that most closely matches the employment category of company officers and general directors in the 




Variable  Description  Sources and links 
% Employers in the 
workforce 
Percentage of the economically-active population aged 15 years through 65 classified as employers in 




II. Climate, geography and natural resources 
 
Temperature  Average temperature during the period 1950-2000 in degrees Celsius. To produce the regional and 
national numbers, we create equal area projections using the Collins-Bartholomew World Digital Map 
and the temperature raster in ArcGIS.  For each region, we sum the temperatures of all cells in that 
region and divide by the number of cells in that region.  At the country level, we calculate this 
variable following the same methodology but using country boundaries. 
Climate: Hijmans, R. et al. (2005) , 
http://www.worldclim.org/ 
Collins-Bartholomew World Digital Map, 
http://www.bartholomewmaps.com/data.
asp?pid=5  
      Inverse distance to 
coast 
The ratio of one over one plus the region’s average distance to the nearest coastline in thousands of 
kilometers.  To calculate each region’s average distance to the nearest coastline we create an equal 
distance projection of the Collins-Bartholomew World Digital Map and a map of the coastlines.  Using 
these two maps we create a raster with the distance to the nearest coastline of each cell in a given 
region. Finally, to get the average distance to the nearest coastline, we sum up the distance to the 
nearest coastline of all cells within each region and divide that sum by the number of cells in the 
region. At the country level, we calculate this variable following the same methodology but using 
country boundaries. 
Collins-Bartholomew World Digital Map, 
http://www.bartholomewmaps.com/data.
asp?pid=5   
     
Ln(Oil production per 
capita) 
Logarithm of one plus the estimated per capita volume of cumulative oil production and reserves by 
region, in millions of barrels of oil. To produce the regional measure, we load the oil map of the 
World Petroleum Assessment and the Collins-Bartholomew World Digital map onto ArcGIS. On-shore 
estimated  oil  in  each  assessment  unit  was  allocated  to  the  regions  based  on  the  fraction  of 
assessment unit area covered by each region.  Off-shore assessment units are not included. The 
World Petroleum Assessment map includes all oil fields in the world except those in the United States 
of  America.  Data  for  the  United  States  is  calculated  using  the  national-level  information  on 
cumulative production and estimated reserves, available from the World Petroleum Assessment 2000 
(USGS), and the United States' regional production and estimated reserves for the year 2000 from the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (USEIA).  The national level data for this variable is calculated 
following the same methodology outlined but using the data on national boundaries.  The national 




d_crpdn_adc_mbbl_a.htm.   
http://www.bartholomewmaps.com/data.
asp?pid=5   
III. Institutions 
 
Informal payments  The average percentage of sales spent on informal payments made to public officials to “get things 
done”  with  regard  to  customs,  taxes,  licenses,  regulations,  services,  etc,  as  reported  by  the 
respondents in the region.   The country-level analog of this variable is the arithmetic average of the 
regions in the country.  Data is from the most recent year available, ranging from 2002 through 2009.   
World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. 
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
     
Ln(Tax days)  The logarithm of one plus the average number of days spent in mandatory meetings and inspections 
with tax authority officials in the past year as reported by respondents in the region.  The country-
level analog of this variable is the arithmetic average of the regions in the country.  Data is for the 
most recent year available, ranging from 2002 through 2009.     
World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. 
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
     
Ln(Days without 
electricity) 
The logarithm of one plus the average number of days without electricity in the past year as reported 
by the respondents in the region.  The country-level analog of this variable is the arithmetic average 
of the regions in the country. Data is for the most recent year available, ranging from 2002 through 
2009.   
World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. 
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
     
Security costs  The  average  costs  of  security  (i.e.,  equipment,  personnel,  or  professional  security  services)  as  a 
percentage of sales as reported by the respondents in the region.  The country-level analog of this 
variable is the arithmetic average of the regions in the country. Data is for the most recent year 
available, ranging from 2002 through 2009.   
World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. 
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
     
Access to land  The percentage of respondents in the region who think that access to land is a moderate, major, or 
very severe obstacle to business.  The country-level analog of this variable is the arithmetic average 
of the regions in the country.  Data is for the most recent year available, ranging from 2002 through 
2009.   
World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. 
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
     
Access to finance  The percentage of respondents in the region who think that access to financing is a moderate, major, 
or  very  severe  obstacle  to  business.    The  country-level  analog  of  this  variable  is  the  arithmetic 
average of the regions in each respective country.  Data is for the most recent year available, ranging 
from 2002 through 2009.   
World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. 
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
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Variable  Description  Sources and links 
Government 
predictability 
The percentage of respondents in the region who tend to agree, agree in most cases, or fully agree 
that their government officials’ interpretation of regulations are consistent and predictable.  The 
country-level analog of this variable is the arithmetic average of the regions in the country. Data is for 
the most recent year available, ranging from 2002 through 2009.   
World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. 
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
     
Doing Business 
percentile rank 
The average of the percentile ranks in each of the following five areas: (1) starting a business; (2) 
dealing with construction permits; (3) registering property; (4) enforcing contracts; and (5) paying 
taxes.    Higher  values  indicate  more  burdensome  regulation.    Data  is  for  the  most  recent  year 
available, ranging from 2007 through 2010.   
 




Institutional Quality  Latent  variable  of:  (1)  (minus)  Informal  payments,  (2)  (minus)  Ln(Tax  days),  (3)  (minus)  Ln(Days 
without  electricity),  (4)  (minus)  Security  costs,  (5)  (minus)  Access  to  land,  (6)  (minus)  Access  to 
finance, (7) Government predictability, and (8) (minus) Doing Business percentile rank.  Higher values 
indicate better institutions.     
  
 
Expropriation Risk  Risk of “outright confiscation and forced nationalization" of property. This variable ranges from zero 
to ten where higher values are equals a lower probability of expropriation. This variable is calculated 
as the average from 1982 through 1997.  
International Country Risk Guide at 
http://www.countrydata.com/datasets/. 
     
IV. Culture 
 
Trust in others  The percentage of respondents in the region who believe that most people can generally be trusted.  
The country-level analog of this variable is the arithmetic average of the regions in the country.  Data 
is for the most recent available year, ranging from 1980 through 2005. 
World Values Survey, 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
     
     
Ln(Nbr ethnic groups)  The logarithm of the number of ethnic  groups that inhabited the region in the year 1964.  The 
country-level analog of this variable is constructed using country boundaries. 
Weidmann et al., 2010, 
http://www.icr.ethz.ch/research/greg 
     
      V.  Enterprise Survey Data 
Ln(Sales – Raw 
Materials - Energy) 
The logarithm of the establishment’s sales minus expenditure on raw materials and energy (in current 
PPP dollars). Data is for the last complete fiscal year, ranging from 2002 through 2009.     
 




The logarithm of the establishment’s expenditure on energy (in current PPP dollars). Data is for the 
last complete fiscal year, ranging from 2002 through 2009.     
 
World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. 
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/  
Years of Education of  
manager 
The number of years of schooling from primary school onwards of the current top manager of the 
establishment. To compute this variable, we use data on the highest educational attainment of the 
top manager and follow the same procedure as used for the previously described years of schooling 
variable at the regional level.  
World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. 
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
     
Years of Education of 
workers 
The number of years of schooling of a typical production worker employed in the establishment. 
Respondents answers may take the following values: (a) 0-3 years, (b) 4-6 years, (c) 7-9 years, (d) 10-
12 years, (e) 13 years and above.  To compute this variable, we use the midpoint of each range or 13 
years as appropriate.   
 
World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. 
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
Ln(1+ Employees)  The logarithm of the total number of employees in the establishment. Data is for the last complete 
fiscal year, ranging from 2002 through 2009.     
World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. 
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
     
Ln(Property, plant, 
and equipment) 
The logarithm of the establishment’s book value of property, plant and equipment (in current PPP 
dollars). Data is for the last complete fiscal year, ranging from 2002 through 2009.     
World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. 
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
Ln(1 + Firm Age)  The logarithm of one plus the number of years that the establishment had been operating in the 
country at the time of the survey , ranging from 2002 through 2009 




Equal to one if either the establishment was part of a larger firm or the firm had more than one 
establishment at the time of the survey; equals zero otherwise.     
 
World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. 
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
Percent Export  Percentage of the establishment’s sales that were directly or indirectly exported.   Data is for the last 
complete fiscal year, ranging from 2002 through 2009.   
 
World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. 
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
Percent equity owned 
by foreigners 
Percent of the firm’s equity owned by private foreign individuals, companies, or organizations at the 
time of the survey, ranging from 2002 through 2009.   
World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. 
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 




Figure 1.  Countries shaded in blue are included in our sample. 
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Figure 2.   Partial correlation plot of (log) Regional income per capita and Years of education in Brazil 
(top left), Colombia (top right), India (bottom left), and Russian Federation (bottom left).   
  
 
Figure 3.  Partial correlation plot of (log) Regional income per capita and Years of education controlling 
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Ratio region highest vs. 
lowest income per capita
Income per capita 1,537 107 11 6,636 3,198 13,859 9,924 2,782 4.41
Years of education 1,519 107 12 6.52 5.30 8.69 2.37 0.73 1.80
Share Pop with high school degree 1,525 110 12 0.18 0.12 0.25 0 0 2.45
Share Pop with college degree 1,525 110 12 0.11 0.06 0.20 0.13 0.04 4.70
Population 1,569 110 12 1,284,631 330,071 3,052,762 2,458,956 873,594 3.11
Temperature 1,568 110 12 16.84 10.23 21.13 4.47 1.45 1.02
Inverse distance to coast 1,569 81 12 0.90 0.80 0.99 0.13 0.05 1.05
Oil production per capita 1,569 69 12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.70
Institutional quality 507 110 5 -0.01 -0.09 0.10 0.15 0.07 0.12
Trust in others 745 107 9 0.23 0.12 0.38 0.22 0.07 1.25
Nbr ethnic groups 1,568 107 12 3.00 1.00 6.00 4.00 1.35 0.86
% Directors and officers in workforce 471 28 14 0.63 0.23 1.36 0.82 0.26 6.84
% Employers in workforce 565 35 13 3.60 2.03 5.29 2.62 0.80 2.52
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics
Medians for:
The table reports descriptive statistics for the variables in the paper.  We report the total number of observations, the number of countries and medians for: (1) the number of regions in a country, (2) the 
country average, (3) the within-country range, (4) the within-country standard deviation, and (5) the ratio of the value of the variable in the region with the highest vs. lowest GDP per capita.  All variables are 
described in Appendix 2.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Years of Education 0.2866
a
(0.0173)
Share Pop with high school degree x 12 0.3180
a
(0.0502)








Inverse distance to coast 0.8937
a
(0.2437)





Trust in others 0.0126
(0.1555)
Ln(Nbr ethnic groups) -0.1473
a
(0.0324)
% Directors and officers in workforce 0.2106
a
(0.0298)















(0.1234) (0.1564) (0.0549) (0.2905) (0.1418) (0.2063) (0.0051) (0.0000) (0.0416) (0.0322) (0.0350) (0.1257)
Observations 1,500 1,506 1,506 1,537 1,536 1,537 1,537 496 739 1,536 447 553
Number of countries 105 105 105 107 107 107 107 79 68 107 27 35
R
2  Within 38% 15% 27% 1% 1% 4% 2% 0% 0% 5% 15% 3%
R
2  Between 58% 33% 34% 3% 27% 13% 4% 25% 18% 17% 7% 14%
R
2  Overall 59% 34% 35% 0% 21% 6% 1% 8% 10% 11% 6% 3%
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
OLS regressions of regional (log) income per capita.   The independent variables are proxies for: (1) education, (2) geography, (3) institutions, and (4) culture.  All regressions include 
country dummies.  The table reports the number of observations, the number of countries, the R
2 within, the R
2 between, and the overall R
2.  Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses.   All variables are described in Appendix 2.
Table 2:   Univariate Regressions for Regional GDP per capita(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Temperature -0.0914
a -0.0189
c -0.0079 -0.0023 -0.0283
b -0.0188
c -0.0171
(0.0100) (0.0106) (0.0110) (0.0108) (0.0134) (0.0107) (0.0171)








(0.5266) (0.5735) (0.5972) (0.5933) (0.7897) (0.6469) (0.7154)








(0.1985) (0.1238) (0.3195) (0.1795) (0.2446) (0.1303) (0.2352)







(0.0305) (0.0331) (0.0484) (0.0496) (0.0345) (0.0364)
Ln(Population) 0.0683
c 0.0307 -0.0280 0.1238 0.0999 0.0909








Trust in others 1.2472 -1.0995
(0.8789) (0.7480)









(0.4598) (0.9368) (0.9703) (1.3235) (2.0129) (0.9282) (2.1565)
Observations 107 105 78 83 68 105 35
Adjusted R
2 50% 63% 70% 69% 49% 63% 79%
Adj. R
2  excluding institutions and culture 50% 63% 69% 63% 49% 63% 74%
Adj. R
2 without education 50% 50% 52% 66% 44% 51% 73%
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Table 3:  National income per capita, Geography, Institutions, and Culture
Ordinary least square regressions of (log) income per capita.  All regressions include temperature, inverse distance to coast, 
and (log) per capita oil production and reserves.  In addition, regressions include measures of: (1) human capital, (2) 
institutions, and (3) culture.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  For comparison, the bottom panel shows the 
adjusted R
2 of two alternative specifications: (1) a regression which excludes the relevant measure of institutions or culture; 
and (2) a regression which excludes years of education.  All variables are described in Appendix 2.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Temperature -0.0156
c -0.0128 -0.0069 0.0003 -0.0142 0.0020 -0.0095
c
(0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0053) (0.0063) (0.0089) (0.0081) (0.0047)







(0.2080) (0.1380) (0.3257) (0.2377) (0.1292) (0.3397) (0.2547)






(0.0477) (0.0470) (0.0970) (0.0593) (0.0491) (0.2006) (0.0643)






(0.0170) (0.0215) (0.0278) (0.0178) (0.0443)
Ln(Population) 0.0122 0.0008 0.0091 0.0165 0.0050 -0.0259
(0.0164) (0.0215) (0.0177) (0.0169) (0.0393) (0.0177)
Institutional quality 0.3667 0.4667
(0.2297) (0.2850)
Trust in others -0.0413 0.0439
(0.0879) (0.1632)
Ln(Nbr ethnic groups) -0.0499
b 0.0005
(0.0243) (0.0490)











(0.2277) (0.1857) (0.4235) (0.2809) (0.1637) (0.6989) (0.2680)
Observations 1,536 1,499 483 728 1,498 281 608
Number of countries 107 105 78 66 105 45 39
R
2  Within 8% 42% 62% 48% 42% 62% 39%
R
2  Between 47% 60% 61% 51% 60% 51% 62%
R
2  Overall 34% 61% 53% 49% 61% 45% 58%
Within R
2  excluding institutions and culture 8% 42% 61% 48% 42% 61% .
Within R
2  excluding education 8% 10% 6% 12% 15% 16% 9%
Between R
2  excluding institutions and culture 47% 60% 60% 51% 60% 50% .
Between R
2  excluding education 48% 42% 46% 6% 47% 63% 68%
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Country fixed-effects regressions of (log) regional income per capita.  All regressions include temperature, inverse distance to coast, and (log) 
per capita oil production and reserves.  In addition, regressions include measures of: (1) human capital, (2) geography, (3) institutions, and (4) 
culture.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  For comparison, the bottom panel shows the adjusted R
2 of two alternative 
specifications: (1) a regression which excludes the relevant measure of institutions or culture; and (2) a regression which excludes education.  
All variables are described in Appendix 2.





(0.0226) (0.0183) (0.0180) (0.0197)
Inverse distance to coast -0.1979 -0.2579 -0.3264 -0.2429
(0.4519) (0.4748) (0.5051) (0.5333)
Ln(Oil production per capita) -1.4113
c -1.1546 -1.1133 15.4289
(0.7138) (0.7858) (0.8374) (45.4751)









(0.0481) (0.0445) (0.0464) (0.0938)





(0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0090)











(0.0340) (0.0279) (0.0265) (0.0301)





(0.0169) (0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0493)





















Observations 6,314 6,314 6,312 2,922
Number of Countries 20 20 20 7
Within R
2  73% 75% 76%
Between R
2  35% 78% 76%
Overall R
2  37% 68% 67%
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Table 5:  Gross value added
OLS Levinsohn Petrin
The table reports regressions for (log) sales minus expenditure on raw materials and energy.  The first three columns show fixed-effect regressions for the 
cross-section while the last column shows Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) panel regressions.  All regressions include temperature, inverse distance to coast, and (log) 
per capita oil production and reserves, years of education, (log) population, country fixed effects, and industry fixed effects.  Other independent variables 
include:  (1) years of education of manager, (2) years of education of workers, (3) (log) employees, (4) (log) property, plant, and equipment, (5) (log) 
expenditure on energy, (5) (log) expenditure on raw materials, (6) (log) firm age, (7) dummy for multiple establishments, (8) percentage of sales exported, and 
(9) percentage of the firm's equity owned by foreigners.  The errors of the fixed-effect regression are clustered at the country-regional level.  Robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses.  All variables are described in Appendix 2.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Temperature -0.0136
c -0.0127 -0.0097 -0.0063 -0.0087 -0.0048 -0.0112
b -0.0070
(0.0078) (0.0084) (0.0073) (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0051)









(0.1603) (0.1395) (0.2593) (0.2417) (0.2566) (0.2382) (0.1990) (0.1818)









(0.0463) (0.0463) (0.0560) (0.0533) (0.0528) (0.0502) (0.0546) (0.0532)







(0.0309) (0.0570) (0.0652) (0.0552) (0.0579) (0.0550) (0.0619)






(0.0210) (0.0256) (0.0398) (0.0439) (0.0401) (0.0412) (0.0344) (0.0348)










(0.0160) (0.0115) (0.0098) (0.0117)








% Employers in workforce 0.0284
c 0.0184
(0.0153) (0.0141)




Years of education manager










(0.2321) (0.1990) (0.2495) (0.3063) (0.2418) (0.2803) (0.2733) (0.2938)
Observations 1,505 1,499 446 441 476 471 551 546
Number of countries 105 105 27 27 28 28 35 35
R
2  Within 39% 43% 49% 58% 48% 56% 49% 56%
R
2  Between 54% 61% 64% 83% 63% 82% 76% 84%
R
2  Overall 54% 62% 63% 77% 63% 77% 72% 78%
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Table 6: Regional income per capita and the Composition of Human Capital
Fixed effects regressions of (log) regional income per capita.  All regressions include temperature, inverse distance to coast, and (log) per capita oil 
production and reserves.  In addition, regressions include: (1) the percentage of the population whose highest educational achievement is high school, 
(2) the percentage of the population with a college degree, (3) the percentage of the population classified as directors and officers of companies, (4) 
the percentage of the population classified as employers, (5)  the percentage of the population classified as self-employed, (6) the years of education 
of the top manager of the establishments surveyed, and (7) the years of education of a typical production worker of the establishments surveyed, (8) 
years of education in the region, and (9) (log) population. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The table reports the number of 
observations, the number of countries, the R2 within, the R2 between, and the overall R2.  All variables are described in Appendix 2.α 50.0% 51.0% 52.0% 53.0% 54.0% 55.0% 56.0% 57.0% 58.0% 59.0% 60.0%
μE  20% 21% 23% 25% 27% 30% 33% 38% 43% 50% 60%
μW  6.0% 5.9% 5.8% 5.7% 5.6% 5.5% 5.4% 5.3% 5.2% 5.1% 5.0%
μavg 11% 12% 13% 15% 18% 21% 26% 33% 42% 55% 74%




Ŷ 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.93 0.98 1.10 1.23 1.48 1.84 2.46 3.57
σ
2









Ŷ 0.91 0.95 1.00 1.09 1.20 1.42 1.67 2.17 2.93 4.24 6.63
σ
2





Y 69% 72% 75% 83% 91% 108% 127% 164% 221% 320% 501%
α 50.0% 51.0% 52.0% 53.0% 54.0% 55.0% 56.0% 57.0% 58.0% 59.0% 60.0%
μE  13% 14% 15% 17% 18% 20% 22% 25% 29% 33% 40%
μW  4.0% 3.9% 3.8% 3.8% 3.7% 3.6% 3.6% 3.5% 3.4% 3.4% 3.3%
μavg 6% 7% 7% 8% 9% 10% 12% 14% 19% 26% 37%




Ŷ 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.78 0.83 0.90 1.01 1.23 1.63
σ
2









Ŷ 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.74 0.78 0.82 0.91 1.05 1.25 1.67 2.49
σ
2





Y 53% 53% 56% 56% 59% 62% 69% 79% 95% 127% 188%
Table 7:  Calibration Exercise
We let the labor share α take values between 50% and 60%.  We set (1-(α+β+δ))*μE and α*μW equal to 0.03 in Panel A and to 0.02 in Panel B.  β equals 0.30, and 
δ equals 0.05.  We report the fraction of the variance of income per capita explained by the model both without externalities (ψ=γ=0) and with them (ψ=7.25 
and γ=0.05). 
Panel B:  Both (1-(α+β+δ))*μE and α*μW equal to 0.020
Panel A:  Both (1-(α+β+δ))*μE and α*μW equal to 0.030Table of contents
1
2














Reporting level for countries in our dataset
Definitions and sources for variables used in the online appendix.
National income per capita, Education, Institutions, Infrastructure, and Culture.
National income per capita and commonly used measures of institutions.
Deta sources for regional GDP.
Deta sources for regional education.
National income per capita, institutions, infrastructure, and culture.
National income per capita and commonly used measures of institutions for countries in the Enterprise Survey.
Univariate regressions for institutions, infrastructure, and culture.
Regional income per capita, Education, Institutions, Infrastructure, and Culture. 
Determinants of firm-level sales.
Regional income per capita, Institutions, Infrastructure, and Culture. 





Regions in our 
dataset
Country names  (number of first-order administrative regions lost)
1. Reporting done at the first-order administrative level: 79 1,362 1,328
   Our regions match first-order administrative level: 60 934 934
   Differences due to :
     Missing information for some region 7 148 130
     Aggregation of some regions 6 183 168
     Political change during sample period 6 97 96 Canada (1), Chile (2), Denmark(-10), Ecuador (2), Peru (2), Senegal (4) 
2. Reporting done for  economic or statistical regions.  First-order 
administrative regions are equivalent to provinces, states or 
departments. 22 691 177
   Most data collected for statistical regions 6 78 44
   GDP per capita collected for statistical regions 4 88 37 Dominican Republic(23), Kazakhstan(10), Cambodia(9), South Korea(9)
   Education collected for statistical regions 12 525 96
3. Reporting done for  economic or statistical regions.  First-order 
administrative regions are equivalent to counties, boroughs, cities, 
districts, or municipalities. 9 782 64
   Most data collected for statistical regions 7 725 52
   Education collected for statistical regions 2 57 12 Hungary(13), Moldova(32)
Total in the sample  110 2,835 1,569
Azerbajan (66), Great Britain (217), Ireland(32), Macedonia(76), Malawi(25), 
Slovenia(181), Uganda(76)
Online Appendix 1: Reporting level for countries in our dataset
The table identifies the reporting level for the regions in our database.  The table splits countries in three main groups:  (1) countries where data is reported at the first-order administrative regions; (2) countries where data is 
reported for economic or statistical regions and where first-order administrative regions are equivalent to provinces, states or derpartments; and (3) countries where data is reported for economic or statistical regions and 
where first-order administrative regions are equivalent to counties, boroughs, cities, districts or municipalities.  The table also subdivides countries based on the reason why the first-order administrative regions are different 
than the reporting regions for each of these three groups of countries.  
France (4 overseas departments), Grece (1 self-governing monastic state),  India (2 
union territories & 1 island), Morocco (2 disputed territories), Pakistan (1 Tribal 
area), Tanzania (5 islands), Venezuela (2)
Croatia (1), Mozambique (1), New Zealand (3), Russia (3), Serbia (6), Switzerland 
(1)
Belgium(-8), Cezch Republic(6), Finland(1), Nepal(9), Portugal (13),Sweden(13)
Burkina Faso(32), Bulgaria(22), Egypt(22), Gabon(5), Guatemala(14), Nigeria(31), 
Philippines(65), Thailand(71), Turkey(69), Romania(34), Uzbekistan(9), 
Vietnam(55)Variable Description Sources and links
Autocracy
This variable classifies regimes based on their degree of autocracy. Democracies are coded as 0, bureaucracies
(dictatorships with a legislature) are coded as 1 and autocracies (dictatorship without a legislature) are coded as
2. Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges afterwards. This variable ranges from zero to two
where higher values equal a higher degree of autocracy. This variable is measured as the average from 1960
through 1990.  
Alvarez et al. (2000).
Executive Constraints
A measure of the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives. The
variable takes seven different values: (1) Unlimited authority (there are no regular limitations on the executive's
actions, as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations); (2)
Intermediate category; (3) Slight to moderate limitation on executive authority (there are some real but limited
restraints on the executive); (4) Intermediate category; (5) Substantial limitations on executive authority (the
executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by
them); (6) Intermediate category; (7) Executive parity or subordination (accountability groups have effective
authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity). This variable ranges from one to
seven where higher values equal a greater extent of institutionalized constraints on the power of chief
executives. This variable is calculated as the average from 1960 through 2000.  
Jaggers and Marshall (2000).
Proportional 
Representation
This variable is equal to one for each year in which candidates were elected using a proportional representation
system; equals zero otherwise. Proportional representation means that candidates are elected based on the
percentage of votes received by their party. This variable is measured as the average from 1975 through 2000.
Beck et al. (2001).
Corruption
The average score of the Transparency International index of corruption perception in 2005. The index provides
a measure of the extent to which corruption is perceived to exist in the public and political sectors. The index
focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. It
is based on assessments by experts and opinion surveys. The index ranges between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10
(highly clean). 
www.transparency.org
US Geological Survey Global GIS database, accessed 
through Harvard University's Geospatial Library. 
Collins-Bartholomew World Digital Map, 
http://www.bartholomewmaps.com/data.asp?pid=
5  
Global Environment Monitoring Unit, 
http://bioval.jrc.ec.europa.eu/products/gam/inde
x.htm




The average of the value of the answers of respondents in the region about the degree of justifiability of the
following four behaviors: (1) Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled; (2) Avoiding a fare on
public transport; (3) Cheating on taxes if you have a chance; and (4) Someone accepting a bribe in the course of
their duties. For each question, possible answers range from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable). We
only include observations with non-missing data for at least two of the four questions. The country-level analog
of this variable is the arithmetic average of the regions in the country. Data is for the most recent available
year, ranging from 1980 through 2005.
World Values Survey, 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
Alesina et al. 2003.
http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/ro
main.wacziarg/papersum.html
Probability of same 
language
The probability that two randomly chosen people, one from the corresponding region and one from the rest of
the country, share the same mother tongue in the year 2004. Where language areas do not overlap with our
regions, we compute the number of people speaking a language in a region by weighing the total number of
people in a language area by the fraction of the region’s surface covered by that language area. We compute
the probability of same language separately for each language in a region and then calculate the surface-
weighted average of the different languages in a region. The country-level analog of this variable is calculated
as the population-weighted average of the regional values.    
World Language Mapping System, 
http://www.gmi.org/wlms/
Notes:
Jaggers, Keith, and Monty Marshall (2000).  Polity IV Project. University of Maryland.
Beck, Thorsten, Gerge Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh (2001). “New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions.” 




Degree of ethnic fractionalization. The variable ranges from 0 to 0.93, with higher values indicating more
fractionalization.
IV.  Enterprise Survey Data
Ln(Sales)
The logarithm of the establishment’s annual sales (in current PPP dollars). Data is for the last complete fiscal
year, ranging from 2002 through 2009.    
World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. 
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/
Ln(Travel time)
The logarithm of the average estimated travel time in minutes from each cell in a region to the nearest city of
50,000 or more people in the year 2000. We use the raster from the Global Environmental Monitoring Unit and
the Collins-Bartholomew World Digital Map. For each region, we sum the travel time from all its cells and divide
by the number of cells in that region. At the country level, we calculate this variable following the same
methodology but using country boundaries.
This table provides the names, definitions and sources of all the variables used in the tables of the online appendix.
Appendix 2– Definitions and sources for variables used in the online appendix
Alvarez, Michael, Jose Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, and Adam Przeworski (2000).  Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-Being in the World 





The logarithm of one plus the length in kilometers of power lines per 10km
2 in the year 1997. To produce the
regional numbers, we load the power line map from the US Geological Survey and the Collins-Bartholomew
World Digital Map onto ArcGIS. We take the ratio of total length of the power lines in the region to the spherical
















Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 0.19
Brazil 27 1.72
Bulgaria 6 0.38







Congo, Dem. Rep. 11 0.70
Costa Rica 7 0.45
Croatia 20 1.27
Cuba 14 0.89
Czech Republic 8 0.51
Denmark 15 0.96
Dominican Republic 9 0.57
Ecuador 22 1.40
Egypt 4 0.25






















Korea, Rep. 7 0.45
Kyrgyz Republic 8 0.51
Lao PDR 18 1.15




































Slovak Republic 8 0.51
Slovenia 12 0.76
South Africa 9 0.57
Spain 19 1.21










United Arab Emirates 7 0.45
United Kingdom 12 0.76






Zimbabwe 10 0.64(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Temperature -0.0189
c -0.0105 -0.0276
b -0.0083 -0.0094 -0.0119 -0.0077 -0.0129 -0.0147
(0.0106) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0119) (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0306)









(0.5735) (0.6321) (0.7006) (0.5698) (0.5856) (0.5762) (0.6091) (0.5616) (2.1131)








(0.1238) (0.5966) (0.5050) (0.3309) (0.3219) (0.3316) (0.3301) (0.4982) (0.4921)










(0.0305) (0.0344) (0.0310) (0.0316) (0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0346) (0.0332) (0.0703)
Ln(Population) 0.0683
c -0.0022 0.0887 0.0428 0.0320 0.0455 0.0429 0.0611 -0.0782










Access to land -0.9170
c
(0.4614)
















(0.9368) (1.1015) (1.2918) (0.9542) (1.0046) (0.9834) (1.1396) (0.9724) (3.1636)
Observations 105 73 55 75 76 77 76 72 17
Adjusted R
2 63% 73% 76% 69% 69% 70% 69% 71% 34%
Adj. R
2  without institution 63% 73% 69% 69% 69% 69% 69% 71% 39%
Adj. R
2 without education 50% 53% 60% 49% 50% 51% 50% 50% 26%
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Online Appendix 4:  National Income per capita, Education, Institutions, Infrastructure, and Culture
Ordinary least square regressions of (log) income per capita.  All regressions include years of education, (log) population, temperature, inverse 
distance to coast, and (log) per capita oil production and reserves.  In addition, regressions include measures of: (1) institutions (Panel A) and 
(2) infrastructure and culture (Panel B).  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  For comparison, the bottom panel shows the 
adjusted R
2 of two alternative specifications: (1) a regression excluding the relevant measure of institutions or culture; and (2) a regression 
excluding education.  All variables are described in Appendix 2.







(0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0134) (0.0145) (0.0107) (0.0107)








(0.5735) (0.6025) (0.6248) (0.7897) (1.0464) (0.6469) (0.5835)








(0.1238) (0.1256) (0.1297) (0.2446) (0.2084) (0.1303) (0.1470)








(0.0305) (0.0332) (0.0319) (0.0496) (0.0537) (0.0345) (0.0379)
Ln(Population) 0.0683
c 0.0684 0.0658 0.1238 0.2164
b 0.0999 0.0812
c
(0.0407) (0.0412) (0.0405) (0.0787) (0.1013) (0.0640) (0.0450)








Ln(Nbr ethnic groups) -0.0996
(0.1549)





b 2.3953 -0.1572 3.4622
a 3.3844
a
(0.9368) (0.9257) (1.2354) (2.0129) (3.2064) (0.9282) (0.9533)
Observations 105 105 105 68 58 105 104
Adjusted R
2 63% 63% 63% 49% 47% 63% 63%
Adj. R
2  without infrastructure or culture 63% 63% 63% 49% 45% 63% 62%
Adj. R
2 without education 50% 54% 50% 44% 42% 51% 52%
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Online Appendix 4:  National Income per capita, Education, Institutions, Infrastructure, and Culture (cont)
Panel B:  Infrastructure and Culture(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Temperature -0.0189
c -0.0192 -0.0139 -0.0023 -0.0181 -0.0100 -0.0283
b -0.0429
a -0.0121
(0.0106) (0.0122) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0126) (0.0104) (0.0134) (0.0145) (0.0123)










(0.5735) (0.7724) (0.6048) (0.5933) (0.6199) (0.5461) (0.7897) (1.0464) (0.6320)










(0.1238) (0.3434) (0.1469) (0.1795) (0.4091) (0.1759) (0.2446) (0.2084) (0.1309)










(0.0305) (0.0438) (0.0430) (0.0484) (0.0363) (0.0349) (0.0496) (0.0537) (0.0330)
Ln(Population) 0.0683
c 0.0370 0.0549 -0.0280 0.0733 0.0504 0.1238 0.2164
b 0.0565




























a 2.3953 -0.1572 4.3364
a
(0.9368) (1.3743) (1.0047) (1.3235) (1.0457) (0.8121) (2.0129) (3.2064) (1.1546)
Observations 105 81 103 83 98 104 68 58 104
Adjusted R
2 63% 67% 65% 69% 63% 69% 49% 47% 64%
Adj. R
2  without institution 63% 64% 63% 63% 62% 63% 49% 45% 63%
Adj. R
2 without education 50% 60% 58% 66% 52% 63% 44% 42% 52%
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Online Appendix 5: National Income per capita and commonly used measures of institutions
Ordinary least square regressions of (log) income per capita.  All regressions include temperature, inverse distance to coast, (log) per capita oil production and 
reserves, years of education, and (log) population.  In addition, regressions include the following variables: (1) Autocracy, (2) Executive constraints, (3) Expropriation 
risk, (4) Proportional representation, (5) Corruption, (6) Trust in others, (7) Civic participation, and (8) Ethnic fractionalization.  Robust standard errors are shown in 
parenthesis.  For comparison, the bottom panel shows the adjusted R
2 of two alternative specifications: (1) a regression excluding the relevant measure of 









(0.0100) (0.0105) (0.0113) (0.0126) (0.0179) (0.0109) (0.0186)








(0.5266) (0.5563) (0.5304) (0.6018) (0.8884) (0.6560) (0.9399)








(0.1985) (0.2224) (0.4440) (0.1845) (0.2805) (0.1940) (0.2684)
Ln(Population) 0.0983
c 0.0360 -0.0557 0.1106 0.1536
b -0.0136








Trust in others 1.4725
c -1.0225
(0.8004) (0.7896)










(0.4598) (1.0908) (1.0403) (1.3470) (1.8746) (1.0954) (2.1274)
Observations 107 105 78 83 68 105 35
Adjusted R
2 50% 50% 52% 66% 44% 51% 73%
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Online Appendix 6:  National Income per capita, Geography, Institutions, and Culture
Ordinary least square regressions of (log) income per capita.  All regressions include temperature, inverse distance to coast, 
and (log) per capita oil production and reserves.  In addition, regressions include measures of: (1) institutions, and (2) 
culture.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.   All variables are described in Appendix 2.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Temperature -0.0118 -0.0153 -0.0093 -0.0045 -0.0100 -0.0111 -0.0291
b -0.0249
c -0.0047
(0.0112) (0.0156) (0.0119) (0.0138) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0127) (0.0124) (0.0120)










(0.5685) (0.7531) (0.5781) (0.6352) (0.6316) (0.5194) (0.7871) (0.7559) (0.5164)










(0.3236) (0.4846) (0.3802) (0.2065) (0.3811) (0.3586) (0.2307) (0.2084) (0.3532)










(0.0332) (0.0405) (0.0374) (0.0467) (0.0350) (0.0356) (0.0391) (0.0384) (0.0330)
Ln(Population) 0.0296 0.0278 0.0260 -0.0373 0.0271 0.0382 0.1280
b 0.1320
b 0.0228






























(0.9477) (1.2791) (0.9577) (1.1629) (1.0261) (0.8006) (1.2707) (1.5125) (0.9279)
Observations 78 55 77 58 73 77 48 44 77
Adjusted R
2 69% 73% 69% 77% 69% 73% 61% 61% 70%
Adj. R
2  without institution 69% 72% 69% 73% 69% 69% 61% 58% 69%
Adj. R
2 without education 49% 55% 54% 66% 51% 62% 47% 48% 52%
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Online Appendix 7:  National income per capita and commonly used measures of institutions for countries in the Enterprise Survey
Ordinary least square regressions of (log) Income per capita for the sample of firms with non-missing values of Quality of Institutions.  All regressions include 
temperature, inverse distance to coast, (log) per capita oil production and reserves, years of education, and (log) population.  In addition, regressions include the 
following variables: (1) Autocracy, (2) Executive constraints, (3) Expropriation risk, (4) Proportional representation, (5) Corruption, (6) Trust in others, (7) Civic 
participation, and (8) Ethnic fractionalization.  Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis.  For comparison, the bottom panel shows the adjusted R
2 of two 
alternative specifications: (1) a regression excluding the relevant measure of institutions or culture; and (2) a regression excluding education.  All variables are 









Access to land 0.0954
(0.2652)





Doing business percentile rank -0.5243
(0.9195)










Ln(Nbr ethnic groups) -0.1473
a
(0.0324)


















(0.0651) (0.1838) (0.3212) (0.0084) (0.0707) (0.0800) (0.0851) (0.3605) (0.0459) (0.2040) (0.0416) (0.0766) (0.0322) (0.1137)
Observations 350 263 219 362 399 393 380 176 1,537 1,537 739 676 1,536 1,513
Number of countries 74 56 73 77 78 77 73 18 107 107 68 73 107 106
R
2  Within 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 5% 7% 0% 0% 5% 1%
R
2  Between 21% 20% 6% 7% 11% 25% 0% 13% 36% 15% 18% 1% 17% 27%
R
2  Overall 17% 8% 2% 4% 5% 7% 0% 1% 27% 11% 10% 0% 11% 21%
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Online Appendix 8: Univariate Regressions for Institutions, Infrastructure, and Culture
Fixed effect regressions of (log) regional income per capita.  All regressions include years of education, (log) population, temperature, inverse distance to coast, and (log) per capita oil production and 
reserves.  In addition, regressions include measures of: (1) institutions (Panel A) and (2) infrastructure and culture (Panel B).  Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis.  For comparison, the bottom 
panel shows the adjusted R
2 of two alternative specifications: (1) a regression excluding the relevant measure of institutions or culture; and (2) a regression exclusing education.  All variables are described in 
Appendix 2.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Temperature -0.0128 -0.0101 -0.0086 -0.0015 -0.0064 -0.0093 -0.0106 -0.0131 0.0016
(0.0083) (0.0096) (0.0078) (0.0122) (0.0093) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0081) (0.0059)
Inverse distance to coast 0.5236
a 0.4647 0.8290
c 0.1810 0.2703 0.4054 0.5133
c 0.4420 0.0913
(0.1380) (0.3293) (0.4273) (0.4312) (0.3041) (0.2636) (0.2822) (0.2788) (0.3460)
Ln(Oil production per capita) 0.1848
a -0.0578 0.1555 -0.0584 -0.0473 -0.0224 -0.0040 -0.0170 0.1834
(0.0470) (0.1283) (0.1319) (0.2503) (0.0862) (0.1081) (0.1113) (0.0735) (0.1160)










(0.0170) (0.0298) (0.0288) (0.0481) (0.0310) (0.0218) (0.0215) (0.0207) (0.0229)
Ln(Population) 0.0122 -0.0185 -0.0175 -0.0442 -0.0191 -0.0087 -0.0098 -0.0113 -0.0026









Access to land -0.1900
(0.1457)

















(0.1857) (0.7043) (0.8220) (0.7867) (0.5993) (0.4664) (0.4827) (0.4629) (0.4428)
Observations 1,499 338 255 216 352 387 381 368 172
Number of countries 105 73 55 72 76 77 76 72 17
R
2  Within 42% 58% 66% 59% 60% 62% 62% 63% 69%
R
2  Between 60% 64% 64% 53% 58% 60% 60% 63% 39%
R
2  Overall 61% 59% 60% 49% 53% 55% 55% 56% 51%
Within R
2  without institution 42% 57% 66% 59% 60% 62% 62% 62% 67%
Within R
2  without education 10% 11% 14% 10% 9% 6% 5% 7% 9%
Between R
2  without institution 60% 64% 63% 53% 58% 60% 60% 63% 41%
Between R
2  without education 42% 25% 20% 21% 26% 35% 39% 45% 50%
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Online Appendix 9: Regional income per capita, Education, Institutions, Infrastructure, and Culture
Panel A:  Institutions
Fixed effect regressions of (log) regional income per capita.  All regressions include years of education, (log) population, temperature, inverse distance to coast, and 
(log) per capita oil production and reserves.  In addition, regressions include measures of: (1) institutions (Panel A) and (2) infrastructure and culture (Panel B).  
Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis.  For comparison, the bottom panel shows the adjusted R
2 of two alternative specifications: (1) a regression 
excluding the relevant measure of institutions or culture; and (2) a regression exclusing education.  All variables are described in Appendix 2.(1) (2) (3) (4) (4) (6) (5)
Temperature -0.0128 -0.0130 -0.0152
c 0.0003 -0.0016 -0.0142 -0.0129
(0.0083) (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0089) (0.0080)








(0.1380) (0.1360) (0.1365) (0.2377) (0.2462) (0.1292) (0.1375)








(0.0470) (0.0475) (0.0469) (0.0593) (0.0624) (0.0491) (0.0488)








(0.0170) (0.0185) (0.0195) (0.0278) (0.0295) (0.0178) (0.0174)
Ln(Population) 0.0122 0.0094 0.0026 0.0091 0.0135 0.0165 0.0111
(0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0181) (0.0177) (0.0181) (0.0169) (0.0153)

















(0.1857) (0.1834) (0.3315) (0.2809) (0.3180) (0.1637) (0.2220)
Observations 1,499 1,499 1,499 728 664 1,498 1,475
Number of countries 105 105 105 66 71 105 104
R
2  Within 42% 42% 43% 48% 47% 42% 42%
R
2  Between 60% 60% 60% 51% 50% 60% 60%
R
2  Overall 61% 61% 61% 49% 46% 61% 61%
Within R
2  without institution 42% 42% 42% 48% 47% 42% 42%
Within R
2  without education 10% 14% 17% 12% 11% 15% 12%
Between R
2  without institution 60% 60% 60% 51% 51% 60% 59%
Between R
2  without education 42% 51% 47% 6% 15% 47% 49%
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Panel B: Infrastructure and Culture








(0.0081) (0.0088) (0.0076) (0.0074) (0.0097) (0.0095) (0.0054)








(0.2108) (0.2034) (0.5458) (0.3334) (0.1699) (0.4740) (0.3366)











(0.0232) (0.0677) (0.0209) (0.0221) (0.0546)
Institutional quality 0.076 -0.4998
(0.3444) (0.3555)
Trust in others -0.0326 0.1301
(0.1295) (0.2603)












(0.2309) (0.3152) (1.1236) (0.4029) (0.2958) (0.9903) (0.2524)
Observations 1,499 1,499 483 728 1498 281 608
Number of countries 105 105 78 66 105 45 39
R
2  Within 8% 10% 6% 12% 15% 16% 9%
R
2  Between 48% 42% 46% 6% 47% 63% 68%
R
2  Overall 35% 32% 30% 5% 40% 37% 31%
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Online Appendix 10: Regional income per capita, Geography, Institutions, and Culture
Fixed effects regressions of (log) regional Income per capita.  All regressions include temperature, inverse distance to coast, 
and (log) per capita oil production and reserves.  In addition, regressions include measures of: (1) geography, (2) 
institutions, and (3) culture.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.   All variables are described in Appendix 2.Temperature -0.0047 -0.0054 -0.0105 -0.0096 -0.0063 -0.0121 -0.0147
c -0.0248
b -0.0156 -0.0063 0.0093 -0.0183 0.0219 -0.0055
(0.0075) (0.0049) (0.0067) (0.0073) (0.0051) (0.0079) (0.0075) (0.0116) (0.0134) (0.0125) (0.0076) (0.0148) (0.0229) (0.0081)









a -0.1259 0.4994 0.3098
b 0.2964 0.5406
c
(0.3714) (0.2648) (0.3840) (0.3810) (0.2503) (0.3830) (0.3742) (0.1867) (0.1394) (0.2109) (0.3284) (0.1322) (0.2331) (0.2833)
Ln(Oil production per capita) 0.1179 0.0626 0.4894 0.1690






(0.1817) (0.1799) (0.3157) (0.0846) (0.1737) (0.2617) (0.1627) (0.0492) (0.0474) (0.0600) (0.0645) (0.0507) (0.1316) (0.0708)











(0.0190) (0.0273) (0.0297) (0.0191) (0.0535) (0.0292) (0.0318) (0.0458) (0.0336) (0.0616)
Ln(Population) -0.0033 0.0046 0.0124 0.0029 0.0124 -0.0572
b 0.0074 -0.0366 -0.0005 0.0125 -0.0501 -0.0017
(0.0263) (0.0278) (0.0423) (0.0270) (0.0521) (0.0236) (0.0225) (0.0346) (0.0212) (0.0242) (0.0591) (0.0274)
Institutional quality 0.2794 0.7022
c 0.1416 0.0744
(0.2915) (0.4058) (0.2100) (0.2249)
Trust in others -0.1288
c -0.0683 -0.0310 -0.0857
(0.0716) (0.1786) (0.1392) (0.3862)
Ln(Nbr ethnic groups) -0.0230 -0.0505 -0.0715
c 0.0149
(0.0333) (0.0569) (0.0365) (0.0681)



















(0.2419) (0.3606) (0.5143) (0.5826) (0.3332) (1.0238) (0.4366) (0.2255) (0.2460) (0.5564) (0.4106) (0.2447) (1.4497) (0.2984)
Observations 654 627 259 243 626 139 243 882 872 224 485 872 142 365
Number of countries 53 52 48 24 52 23 18 54 53 30 42 53 22 21
R
2  Within 7% 44% 63% 53% 43% 62% 48% 10% 43% 65% 48% 44% 72% 35%
R
2  Between 13% 19% 42% 10% 19% 33% 39% 23% 52% 43% 61% 52% 47% 67%
R
2  Overall 10% 24% 41% 15% 23% 35% 36% 14% 56% 41% 54% 56% 41% 64%
χ2 Coeff on Yrs Educ is equal 11.81 15.78 7.17 8.91 16.19 0
Significance 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 99%
Online Appendix 11:   Regional income per capita, Geography, Institutions, and Culture for countries above and below median GDP per capita
Countries with GDP pc > Median Countries with GDP pc < Median
Ordinary least square regressions of (log) income per capita.  We report separate results for countries above and below the median of GDP per capita in 2005.  All regressions include years of 
education, (log) population, temperature, inverse distance to coast, and (log) per capita oil production and reserves.  In addition, regressions include measures of: (1) institutions (Panel A) and (2) 
infrastructure and culture (Panel B).  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  For comparison, the bottom panel shows the adjusted R
2 of two alternative specifications: (1) a regression 
excluding the relevant measure of institutions or culture; and (2) a regression excluding education.  All variables are described in Appendix 2.(1) (2) (3) (4)
Temperature 0.0583
b 0.0236 0.0052 0.0552
a
(0.0252) (0.0187) (0.0117) (0.0167)
Inverse distance to coast 0.3079 0.2257 -0.2359 -0.2964
(0.4764) (0.4568) (0.2293) (0.4988)
Ln(Oil production per capita) -1.8063
a -1.4545
c -0.1341 13.8526
(0.6685) (0.7439) (0.2973) (63.6455)
Years of education 0.0412 0.0460
b 0.0373
a -0.0131




(0.0464) (0.0405) (0.0224) (0.0819)





(0.0060) (0.0048) (0.0024) (0.0071)
Years of education of workers 0.0126
c 0.0099 0.0033 0.0240
a






(0.0356) (0.0296) (0.0177) (0.0268)





(0.0194) (0.0179) (0.0082) (0.0539)




. (0.0283) (0.0146) (0.0798)
Ln(Expenditure on raw materials) . . 0.5885
a
. . (0.0204)
Ln(1 + Firm age) . . 0.0209
b -0.0307
. . (0.0103) (0.0291)
Multiple establishments . . 0.0787
a
. . (0.0232)
% Export . . 0.0005
. . (0.0004)








Observations 6,314 6,314 6,312 2,922
Number of Countries 20 20 20 7
Within R
2  74% 79% 93%
Between R
2  40% 88% 98%
Overall R
2  41% 78% 96%
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Online Appendix 12:  Determinants of firm-level sales
The table reports regressions for (log) sales.  The first three columns show fixed-effect regressions for the cross-section while the last column shows 
Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) panel regressions.  All regressions include temperature, inverse distance to coast, and (log) per capita oil production and reserves, 
years of education, (log) population, country fixed effects, and industry fixed effects.  Other independent variables include:  (1) (log) employees, (2) (log) 
property, plant, and equipment, (3) (log) expenditure on energy, (4) (log) firm age, (5) dummy for multiple establishments, (6) percentage of sales exported, 
(9) percentage of the firm's equity owned by foreigners, (10) years of education of manager, (11) years of education of workers.  The errors of the fixed-
effect regression are clustered at the country-regional level.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  All variables are described in Appendix 2.
OLS Levinsohn Petrin(1) (2) (3)


























Ln(1 + Firm age) . . 0.0340
b
. . (0.0169)
Multiple establishments . . 0.0785
b
. . (0.0329)
% Export . . 0.0009
. . (0.0008)








Observations 6,314 6,314 6,312
Adjusted R
2  77% 77% 78%
Country x Region x Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Online Appendix 13:  Fixed-effect regressions for gross value added
The table reports fixed-effect regressions for (log) sales minus expenditure on raw materials and energy.  Independent variables 
include:  (1) years of education of manager, (2) years of education of workers, (3) (log) employees, (4) (log) property, plant, and 
equipment, (5) (log) expenditure on energy, (5) (log) expenditure on raw materials, (6) (log) firm age, (7) dummy for multiple 
establishments, (8) percentage of sales exported, and (9) percentage of the firm's equity owned by foreigners.  All regressions 
incude country and industry x region fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  All variables are described 
in Appendix 2.Code Country Source Type of Data Available link
ALB Albania HDR 2002 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
ARE United Arab Emirates HDR 1997 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
ARG Argentina National Statistical Office, Ministry of Interior GDP http://www.econ.uba.ar/www/institutos/admin/ciap/baseciap/base.htm
ARG Argentina National Statistical Office, Ministry of Interior GDP http://www.indec.mecon.ar/default.htm
ARG Argentina National Statistical Office, Ministry of Interior GDP http://www.mininterior.gov.ar/
ARM Armenia National Statistics Office Expenditure http://www.armstat.am/file/article/marz_07_e_22.pdf
ARM Armenia National Statistics Office Expenditure http://www.armstat.am/file/article/marz_11_29.pdf
AUS Australia OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
AUT Austria OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
AZE Azerbaijan National Statistics Office Income http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/budget_households/en/003.shtml
BEL Belgium OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
BEN Benin HDR 2007/2008 and 2003 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
BFA Burkina Faso HDR for GDP per capita GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
BGD Bangladesh N/A
BGR Bulgaria HDR 2003, 2002 and 2001 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina National Statistics Offices GDP http://www.fzzpr.gov.ba/makro_pok_arh.htm
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina National Statistics Offices GDP http://www.fzs.ba/god2008/GODISNJAK%202008.pdf
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina National Statistics Offices GDP http://www.fzs.ba/Gdp/GDP_INVESTICIJE2007.pdf
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina National Statistics Offices GDP http://www.rzs.rs.ba/PublikacijeENG.htm
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina National Statistics Offices GDP http://www.rzs.rs.ba/SaopstenjaNacRacENG.htm
BLZ Belize LSMS 2002 Expenditure http://www.statisticsbelize.org.bz/dms20uc/dm_filedetails.asp?action=d&did=13
BOL Bolivia National Statistics Office GDP http://www.ine.gov.bo/indice/visualizador.aspx?ah=PC0104010201.HTM
BOL Bolivia National Statistics Office GDP http://www.ine.gob.bo/indice/general.aspx?codigo=40203
BRA Brazil National Statistics Office GDP http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/economia/contasregionais/2002_2005/contasregionais2002_2005.pdf
BRA Brazil National Statistics Office GDP http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/economia/contasregionais/2003_2006/tabela04.pdf
BRA Brazil National Statistics Office GDP http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/economia/contasregionais/2001/RPCPIBpm.pdf
CAN Canada OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
CHE Switzerland National Statistics Office Cantonal revenue http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/04/02/05/key/gesamtes_volkseinkommen.html
CHL Chile National Statistics Office GDP http://www.bcentral.cl/publicaciones/estadisticas/actividad-economica-gasto/aeg07a.htm
CHN China National Statistics Yearbooks 1996, 1998, 2002, 2006 GDP http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB1998e/C3-8E.htm
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB1996e/B2-11e.htm
CMR Cameroon National Statistics Office Expenditure http://www.statistics-cameroon.org/archive/ECAM/ECAM2001/survey0/data/ECAM2001/Documentation/ECAM%20II%20-%20Rapport%20principal.pdf
CMR Cameroon National Statistics Office Expenditure http://nada.stat.cm/index.php/ddibrowser/20/download/166
CMR Cameroon National Statistics Office Expenditure http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB2002e/htm/c0308e.htm
CMR Cameroon National Statistics Office Expenditure http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2006/html/C0308E.xls
CMR Cameroon National Statistics Office Expenditure http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/
COL Colombia National Statistics Office GDP http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=129&Itemid=86
CRI Costa Rica N/A
CUB Cuba HDR 1996 Wages http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
CZE Czech Republic OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
DEU Germany OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
DNK Denmark OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
DOM Dominican Republic National Statistics Office GDP http://www.one.gob.do/index.php?module=articles&func=view&ptid=11&catid=181
ECU Ecuador National Statistics Office GDP http://www.bce.fin.ec/frame.php?CNT=ARB0000175
EGY Egypt HDRs 2008, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2001 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
ESP Spain  OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
EST Estonia  National Statistics Office GDP
http://pub.stat.ee/px-
web.2001/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=NAA050&ti=GROSS+DOMESTIC+PRODUCT+BY+COUNTY&path=../I_Databas/Economy/23National_accounts/01Gross_domestic_product_%28GDP%29/14Regional_gross_domestic_product/&lang=1
FIN Finland OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
FRA France OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
GAB Gabon HDR 2005 Expenditure http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
GBR United Kingdom OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
GEO Georgia HDR 2002 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
GHA Ghana LSMS 1998/1999 and 1991/1992, World Bank Income http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLSMS/Resources/3358986-1181743055198/3877319-1190221709991/G3report.pdf
GHA Ghana LSMS 1998/1999 and 1991/1992, World Bank Income http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLSMS/Resources/3358986-1181743055198/3877319-1190217341170/PovProf.pdf
GRC Greece OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
GTM Guatemala HDR 2007/2008 GDP http://cms.fideck.com/userfiles/desarrollohumano.org/File/8012264236003654.pdf
HND Honduras HDR 2006 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
HRV Croatia National Statistics Office GDP http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv/publication/2009/12-1-5_1h2009.htm
HRV Croatia National Statistics Office GDP http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2010/12-01-02_01_2010.htm
HRV Croatia National Statistics Office GDP http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2011/12-01-02_01_2011.htm
HRV Croatia National Statistics Office GDP http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2012/12-01-02_01_2012.htm
HRV Croatia National Statistics Office GDP http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2012/12-01-02_01_2012.htm
HUN Hungary OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
IDN Indonesia National Statistics Office GDP http://dds.bps.go.id/eng/tab_sub/view.php?tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek=52&notab=1
IND India National Statistics Office GDP http://mospi.nic.in/6_gsdp_cur_9394ser.htm
IRL Ireland OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
IRN Iran National Statistics Office GDP http://amar.sci.org.ir/index_e.aspx
ISR Israel
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series International  
(IPUMS)
Income https://international.ipums.org/international/ 
ITA Italy OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
JOR Jordan HDR 2004 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
JPN Japan OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
KAZ Kazakhstan LSMS 1996, World Bank Income http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLSMS/Resources/3358986-1181743055198/3877319-1181930718899/finrep1.pdf
KEN Kenya HDR 2006, 2005, 2003, 2001 and 1999 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic HDR 2005, 2001 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
KHM Cambodia Poverty profile of Cambodia 2004




Online Appendix 14:  DATA SOURCES ON REGIONAL GDPCode Country Source Type of Data Available link
KOR Korea, Rep. OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
LAO Lao PDR HDR 2006 C+I+G http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
LBN Lebanon HDR 2001 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
LKA Sri Lanka HDR 1998, and National Statistics Office GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
LSO Lesotho HDR 2006 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
LTU Lithuania National Statistics Office GDP http://db1.stat.gov.lt/statbank/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?MainTable=M2010210&PLanguage=1&PXSId=0&ShowNews=OFF
http://db1.stat.gov.lt/statbank/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?MainTable=M2010210&PLanguage=1&PXSId=0&ShowNews=OFF




HDR 1999, 2003 and Enquete Nationale sur la 
Consommation et les Depenses des Menages 2000/2001
GDP + Expenditure http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
http://www.lavieeco.com/documents_officiels/Enqu%C3%AAte%20nationale%20sur%20la%20consommation%20et%20les%20d%C3%A9penses%20des%20m%C3%A9nages.pdf
MDA Moldova 2007 Statistical Yearbook; monthly salary Wages http://www.statistica.md/category.php?l=en&idc=452&
MDG Madagascar HDR 2003, 2000 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
MEX Mexico OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
MKD Macedonia, FYR National Statistics Office GDP http://www.stat.gov.mk/Publikacii/3.4.9.04.pdf
MNG Mongolia National Statistics Office GDP https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=serc2009&paper_id=128
MOZ Mozambique HDR 2007, 2001 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
MWI Malawi Malawi Integrated Household Survey 1998, 2004-2005 Expenditure http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLSMS/Resources/3358986-1181743055198/3877319-1181928149600/IHS2_Basic_Information2.pdf
http://www.nso.malawi.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4&Itemid=4#_Toc529845580
MYS Malaysia 5th Malaysia Plan, 6th Malaysia Plan GDP http://www.pmo.gov.my/?menu=page&page=2005
NAM Namibia
Namibia Household Income & Expenditure Survey 
2003/2004
Expenditure http://www.npc.gov.na/publications/prenhies03_04.pdf
NER Niger HDR 1997, 1998, 2000, 2004 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
NGA Nigeria 2006 Annual Abstract of Statistics.  Income http://nigerianstat.gov.ng/
NGA Nigeria 2006 Annual Abstract of Statistics.  Income http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/nbsapps/annual_report.htm
NIC Nicaragua HDR 2002 Expenditure http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
NLD Netherlands OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
NOR Norway OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
NPL Nepal HDR 2004, 2001 and 1998 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
NZL New Zealand OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
PAK Pakistan HDR 2003 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
PAN Panama National Statistics Office GDP http://www.contraloria.gob.pa/dec/
PAN Panama National Statistics Office GDP http://www.contraloria.gob.pa/inec/cuadros.aspx?ID=041635
PAN Panama National Statistics Office GDP http://www.contraloria.gob.pa/dec/cuadros.aspx?ID=041620
PAN Panama National Statistics Office GDP http://www.contraloria.gob.pa/inec/cuadros.aspx?ID=1614
PER Peru




Cuentas Nacionales del Peru, Producto Bruto Interno 
por Departmentos 2001-2006
GDP http://www.inei.gob.pe/biblioineipub/bancopub/Est/Lib0995/Libro.pdf
PHL Philippines National Statistics Office GDP http://www3.pids.gov.ph/ris/books/pidsbk93-dcntrlztn.pdf
PHL Philippines National Statistics Office GDP http://www.nscb.gov.ph/grdp/default.asp
POL Poland OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
PRT Portugal OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
PRY Paraguay Atlas de Desarrollo Humano Paraguay 2007 GDP http://www.undp.org.py/dh/?page=atlas
ROM Romania National Statistics Office GDP http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/pdf/en/cp11.pdf
ROM Romania National Statistics Office GDP www.insse.ro/cms/files/Anuar%2520statistic/11/11.30.xls
RUS Russian Federation National Statistics Office GDP http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b07_14p/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d02/10-02.htm
RUS Russian Federation National Statistics Office GDP http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b01_19/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/dusha98-07.htm
SEN Senegal HDR 2001 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
SLV El Salvador HDR 2007/2008, 2005, 2003, 2001 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
SRB Serbia National Statistics Municipal Database Income http://pod2.stat.gov.rs/ObjavljenePublikacije/G2010/pdfE/G20106008.pdf
SVK Slovak Republic OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
SVN Slovenia National Statistics Office GDP http://www.stat.si/eng/novica_prikazi.aspx?id=1318
SVN Slovenia National Statistics Office GDP http://pxweb.stat.si/pxweb/Database/Economy/03_national_accounts/30_03092_regional_acc/30_03092_regional_acc.asp
SWE Sweden OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
SWZ Swaziland HDR 2008 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
SYR Syrian Arab Republic HDR 2005 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
THA Thailand Statistical Year Book Thailand 2002 GDP http://web.nso.go.th/eng/en/pub/pub.htm
TUR Turkey National Statistics Office GDP http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=56&ust_id=16
TUR Turkey National Statistics Office GDP http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=56&ust_id=16
TZA Tanzania National Statistics Office GDP http://www.tanzania.go.tz/regions/MOROGORO.pdf
UGA Uganda HDR 2007 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
UKR Ukraine National Statistics Office GDP http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2008/vvp/vrp/vrp2008_e.htm
URY Uruguay HDR 2005 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
USA United States OECDStats GDP http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
UZB Uzbekistan HDR 2007/8, 2000 and 1998 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
VEN Venezuela HDR 2000 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
VNM Vietnam National Statistics Office Wages http://www.gso.gov.vn/Modules/Doc_Download.aspx?DocID=2097
VNM Vietnam National Statistics Office Wages http://www.gso.gov.vn/Modules/Doc_Download.aspx?DocID=2300
ZAF South Africa National Statistics Office  GDP http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsdownload.asp?PPN=P0441&SCH=4048
ZAF South Africa National Statistics Office  GDP http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0441/P04413rdQuarter2010.pdf
ZAF South Africa National Statistics Office  GDP http://www.gso.gov.vn/Modules/Doc_Download.aspx?DocID=4800
ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. HDR 2008 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
ZMB Zambia HDR 2007 and 2003 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
ZWE Zimbabwe HDR 2003 GDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/Code Country Source Available Link
ALB Albania NA
ARE United Arab Emirates Ministry of Economy, 2005 Census http://www.economy.ae/English/economicandstatisticreports/statisticreports/pages/census2005.aspx
ARG Argentina Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
ARM Armenia Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
AUS Australia National Statistics Office http://www.abs.gov.au/ 
AUT Austria Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
AZE Azerbaijan Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
BEL Belgium Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
BEN Benin Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
BFA Burkina Faso Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
BGD Bangladesh Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
BGR Bulgaria Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
BLZ Belize Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
BOL Bolivia Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
BRA Brazil Integrated Public Use Microdata Series International  (IPUMS) https://international.ipums.org/international/ 
CAN Canada National Statistics Office, IPUMS http://www40.statcan.gc.ca/l01/cst01/educ43a-eng.htm
CAN Canada National Statistics Office, IPUMS http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/english/census96/data/profiles/DataTable.cfm?YEAR=1996&LANG=E&PID=35782&S=A&GID=199131
CAN Canada National Statistics Office, IPUMS https://international.ipums.org/international/ 
CHE Switzerland Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) SFSO http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/15/04/ind4.informations.40101.401.html
CHL Chile National Statistics Office http://espino.ine.cl/CuadrosCensales/apli_excel.asp
CHN China National Statistics Office http://www.stats.gov.cn/ndsj/information/nj97/C091A.END
CHN China National Statistics Office http://www.stats.gov.cn/ndsj/information/nj97/C092A.END
CHN China National Statistics Office http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB1998e/D4-8E.htm
CHN China National Statistics Office http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2005/html/D0411e.htm
CMR Cameroon Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
COL Colombia National Statistics Office http://190.25.231.246:8080/Dane/tree.jsf
CRI Costa Rica Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
CUB Cuba NA
CZE Czech Republic Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
DEU Germany Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
DNK Denmark National Statistics Office http://www.statbank.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?Maintable=RASU1&PLanguage=1
DOM Dominican Republic Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
ECU Ecuador National Statistics Office http://190.95.171.13/cgibin/RpWebEngine.exe/PortalAction?&MODE=MAIN&BASE=ECUADOR21&MAIN=WebServerMain.inl
ECU Ecuador National Statistics Office http://190.95.171.13/cgibin/RpWebEngine.exe/PortalAction?&MODE=MAIN&BASE=ECUADOR90&MAIN=WebServerMain.inl
EGY Egypt Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
ESP Spain Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
EST Estonia National Statistics Office
http://pub.stat.ee/px-
web.2001/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=PC414&ti=ECONOMICALLY+ACTIVE+POPULATION+BY+AGE,+EDUCATIONAL+ATTAINMENT+AND+ETHNIC+NATIONALITY*&path=../I_Databas/Population_censu
FIN Finland Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
FRA France Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
GAB Gabon Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
GBR United Kingdom Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
GEO Georgia National Statistics Office (special request of data)
GHA Ghana Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
GRC Greece Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
GTM Guatemala Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
HND Honduras Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
HRV Croatia National Statistics Office http://www.dzs.hr/Eng/censuses/Census2001/Popis/E01_01_07/E01_01_07.html
HUN Hungary Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
IDN Indonesia Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
IND India Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
IRL Ireland Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
IRN Iran NA https://international.ipums.org/international/ 
ISR Israel Integrated Public Use Microdata Series International  (IPUMS) https://international.ipums.org/international/ 
ITA Italy Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
JOR Jordan Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
JPN Japan National Statistics Office http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/chiiki/ToukeiDataSelectDispatchAction.do
KAZ Kazakhstan Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
KEN Kenya Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
KHM Cambodia Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
KOR Korea, Rep. NA
LAO Lao PDR Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
LBN Lebanon Ministry of Social Affairs http://www.cas.gov.lb/images/PDFs/Educational%20status-2004.pdf
LKA Sri Lanka Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
Online Appendix 15:  DATA SOURCES ON REGIONAL EDUCATIONCode Country Source Available Link
LSO Lesotho Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
LTU Lithuania National Statistics Office
http://db.stat.gov.lt/sips/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=gs_dem17en&ti=Population+by+educational+attainment+and+age+group%A0%28aged+10+years+and+over%29&path=../Database/cen_en/p7
1en/demography/〈=2
LVA Latvia National Statistics Office
http://data.csb.gov.lv/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=tsk03a&ti=EDUCATIONAL+ATTAINMENT+OF+POPULATION&path=../DATABASEEN/tautassk/Results%20of%20Population%20Census%202000%20in
%20brief/〈=1
MAR Morocco Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
MDA Moldova Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
MDG Madagascar Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
MEX Mexico Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
MKD Macedonia, FYR Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
MNG Mongolia Integrated Public Use Microdata Series International  (IPUMS) https://international.ipums.org/international/ 
MOZ Mozambique Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
MWI Malawi Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
MYS Malaysia Integrated Public Use Microdata Series International  (IPUMS) https://international.ipums.org/international/ 
NAM Namibia Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
NER Niger Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
NGA Nigeria Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
NIC Nicaragua Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
NLD Netherlands Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
NOR Norway National Statistics Office http://statbank.ssb.no/statistikkbanken/Default_FR.asp?PXSid=0&nvl=true&PLanguage=1&tilside=selecttable/hovedtabellHjem.asp&KortnavnWeb=utniv
NPL Nepal Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
NZL New Zealand National Statistics Office http://wdmzpub01.stats.govt.nz/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx
PAK Pakistan Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
PAN Panama Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
PER Peru Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
PHL Philippines Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
POL Poland Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
PRT Portugal Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
PRY Paraguay National Statistics Office http://celade.cepal.org/cgibin/RpWebEngine.exe/EasyCross?&BASE=CPVPRY2002&ITEM=INDICADO&MAIN=WebServerMain.inl
ROM Romania Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
RUS Russian Federation National Statistics Office http://74.125.65.132/translate_c?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&sl=ru&tl=en&u=http://www.perepis2002.ru/index.html%3Fid%3D15&prev=_t&usg=ALkJrhiZr6thPp3doxH9mXdDZgf-DA1fyw
SEN Senegal Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
SLV El Salvador VI Censo de la Poblacion y V de Vivienda 2007 http://www.digestyc.gob.sv/cgibin/RpWebEngine.exe/Crosstabs 
SRB Serbia National Statistics Office, EPDC http://webrzs.statserb.sr.gov.yu/axd/en/Zip/CensusBook4.zip
SRB Serbia National Statistics Office, EPDC http://epdc.org/
SVK Slovak Republic National Statistics Office http://px-web.statistics.sk/PXWebSlovak/DATABASE/En/02EmploMarket/01EconPopActiv/EA_total.px
SVN Slovenia National Statistics Office http://www.stat.si/pxweb/Database/Census2002/Administrative%20units/Population/Education/Education.asp
SVN Slovenia National Statistics Office http://www.stat.si/pxweb/Database/Demographics/05_population/08_05088_census/02_05565_L_1991/02_05565_L_1991.asp
SWE Sweden National Statistics Office
http://www.ssd.scb.se/databaser/makro/SubTable.asp?yp=tansss&xu=C9233001&omradekod=UF&huvudtabell=Utbildning&omradetext=Education+and+research&tabelltext=Population+16-
74+years+of+age+by+highest+level+of+education,+age+and+sex.+Year&preskat=O&prodid=UF0506&starttid=1985&stopptid=2007&Fromwhere=M〈=2&langdb=2
SWZ Swaziland Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
SYR Syrian Arab Republic Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
THA Thailand Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
TUR Turkey National Statistics Office, EPDC http://www.tuik.gov.tr/isgucueng/Kurumsal.do
TUR Turkey National Statistics Office, EPDC http://epdc.org/
TZA Tanzania Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
UGA Uganda Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
UKR Ukraine National Statistics Office http://stat6.stat.lviv.ua/PXWEB2007/Database/POPULATION/1/06/06.asp
URY Uruguay National Statistics Office http://www.ine.gub.uy/microdatos/engih2006/persona.zip,
URY Uruguay National Statistics Office http://www.ine.gub.uy/microdatos/microdatosnew2008.asp
USA United States National Statistics Office, IPUMS http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lang=en&_ts=
USA United States National Statistics Office, IPUMS https://international.ipums.org/international/ 
UZB Uzbekistan Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
VEN Venezuela Integrated Public Use Microdata Series International  (IPUMS) https://international.ipums.org/international/ 
VNM Vietnam Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
ZAF South Africa National Statistics Office, IPUMS
http://www.statssa.gov.za/timeseriesdata/pxweb2006/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=Highest%20level%20of%20education%20grouped%20by%20province&ti=Table:+Census+2001+by+province,+high
est+level+of+education+grouped,++population+group+and+gender.+&path=../Database/South%20Africa/Population%20Census/Census%202001%20-
ZAF South Africa National Statistics Office, IPUMS
http://www.statssa.gov.za/timeseriesdata/pxweb2006/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=Level%20of%20education&ti=Table:+Population+Census+1996+by+province,+gender,+highest+education++level+
and+population+group.+&path=../Database/South%20Africa/Population%20Census/Census%201996/Provincial%20level%20-%20Persons/〈=1
ZAF South Africa National Statistics Office, IPUMS https://international.ipums.org/international/ 
ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
ZMB Zambia Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
ZWE Zimbabwe Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/